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Mergers are not imcommon in higher education, yet the
phencanenon has rarely been the subject of research.

Although some

private sector combinations have been the focus of inquiry, there
is a notable lack of study of mergers involving public
institutions of higher education.

This work concentrates on

public sector mergers in Massachusetts for the period 1964-1985.
The project shows that a critical dichotony in understanding the
nature of merger exists between institutional and public
participants in the merger process.
At the institutional level, the focus of attention is on the
relatively narrow matters of organizational structure and
integrity, vdiile the makers of public policy are concerned with
the larger issue of service to constituents.

As a result of this

disparity in perspective, institutional representatives may fail

V

to understand the larger public policy context of the merger
process.

Merger in the public sector is ultimately a matter of

public policy, not just a characteristic of institutional
development and evolution.
Hiis historical analysis examines four separate public
mergers:

A 1964 combination of two former textile schools that

created the present Southeastern Massachusetts University; a 1975
merger of a technological institute (and former textile school)
and a state college that produced the University of Lowell; a 1981
union of an urban campus of a state university and a state college
that expanded the IMiversity of Massachusetts at Boston, and a
1985 consolidation of a ccanmunity college and a technical
institute that led to a diversified Massasoit Community College.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCnC^ AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
On August 1, 1985, Massasoit Community College, Brockton,
Massachusetts and the Blue Hills Technical Institute, Canton,
Massachusetts were merged.

Documents were signed transferring

current and non-current assets and liabilities, title to property
passed, corporate responsibilities changed, and lawyers earned
their fees.

Where two separate and independent institutions

existed on July 31, a single entity, Massasoit Community College,
was formed on August 1.

It remained for the new Massasoit to

continue under different circumstances those ongoing
organizational processes of self-definition, establishing purpose,
and evaluating prospects.
It is a simple task to identify the point of merger as
occurring on August 1, 1985.

Yet the events of that day merely

represent the legal culmination of a process started one and a
half years earlier.
The concept of a merger is one of common understanding.

All

who read the introductory sentence above know what happened in
August of 1985.

While familiarity with the term easily calls to

the mind of the reader the lexical meaning of the word,
surprisingly, this knowledge often belies a real understanding of
the phenomenon of merger, especially in higher education,

tfergers

in higher education have rarely been the subject of research and
study, and evaluations of public sector mergers are particularly
scarce.

Yet the occurence of a merger is a significant event in

the lives of many people and is of material financial importance.
The merger of Massasoit Ctoinmunity College and the Blue Hills
Technical Institute alone involved hundreds of employees,
thousands of students and millions of dollars.
At the time of the merger, I was the chief fiscal and
administrative officer at Massasoit Community College.

I was

deeply involved in all of the negotiations regarding this
combination including not only the financial settlement, but
personnel, programmatic and other issues.

As a result, I became

aware of the importance of the merger experience and the notable
lack of research of the matter as well.
This i^enomenon of merger needs to be better understood.
What are the causes and conditions that obtain in the merger
process?

As one step toward an understanding of mergers, this

study will focus on cases of actxial public sector itergers in
Massachusetts higher education with a concentration on the
Massasoit-Blue Hills union.
on two levels.

Conceptually this study will proceed

Attention will be paid to those institutional

characteristics which loom important in the merger situations
being evaluated.

Some initial generalizations will be made

regarding these traits and the process of merger.
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In addition.

Ccureful thought will be given to the larger environment of these
public sector mergers so that matters of public policy can
likewise be considered.

This effort will add to the pool of

literature on the subject of merger and the findings should point
to several areas of possible further research.
As the merger was accomplished Massasoit Community College
was one of fifteen state supported regional community colleges in
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

It was governed by a local

board of trustees and was responsible to the Board of Regents of
Higher Education vrtiich oversaw all of the Commonwealth's public
colleges and universities.

The College was funded by annual state

appropriations as well as locally retained fees and revenue.
The Blue Hills Technical Institute was operated under the
auspices of the Blue Hills Regional School District, a school
district with a vocational education mission supported by seven
area towns.

The Technical Institute was the postsecondary arm of

the district which also operated a regional high school for grades
nine to twelve.
In January, 1984 the Superintendent of the Blue Hills
Regional School District initiated discussions with the President
of Massasoit Community College vdiich ultimately resulted in a
merger of the two institutions.

The impetus for these talks by

the superintendent can be traced directly to the impact of
Proposition 2 1/2 on the operation of the regional school
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district.

This 1980 state^wide referendum capped local government

taxing authority and brought cutbacks in public services in most
communities in the state.

Proposition 2 1/2 also limited school

district autonomy, a Massachusetts law that had previously given
school districts considerable statutory leverage over town
government in the annual budget process.

Proposition 2 1/2 placed

funding for schools on the same footing as all other town services
in the competition for the local tax dollar.
The Blue Hills operation before 1980 was supported by funds
from the towns in the seven member school district, a modest
tuition charge, and state aid through a formula allocation.

The

diminished local revenue and loss of school district autonomy
created by Proposition 2 1/2 resulted in the mandate from the
towns through the school committee that the Technical Institute
become self-supporting.

No longer woiild local funds be made

available for the routine operation of the Institute.
state aid would be the source of operating funds.

Tuition and

The vocational

high school, however, would continue to receive local support.
Tuition at the Technical Institute rapidly increased from
approximately $500 a year in 1980-81 to nearly $2,500 in the
1984-85 academic year.

At the same time the tuition increases

were levied, the Institute began an active effort to recruit and
enroll students fr<xn outside the seven towns of the district to
enlarge its student base.

Ironically, the state formula funding
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mechanism for regional school districts did not weigh funds from
local appropriated sources but did factor tuition in the
computation.

The result was a decrease in the relative level of

state aid as tuition rose.

Increasing tuition charges, no local

funding for annual operations, and decreasing state support in a
period of declining enrollment made it clear that for the long run
the Technical Institute could not survive as it was then
structured. The leadership of the regional school district did,
however, believe in the value of the Institute's programs and
sought an alternative to closure.
Additional state support outside of the regional district
formula funding mechanism was considered to be the most reasonable
opportunity.

The district was successful in having a local

legislator insert in the House budget act a separate line item
appropriation under the budget section of the Board of Regents of
Higher Education.

While the line item won support in the House,

opposition by the Board of Regents and a lack of support in the
Senate and in Conference Committee finally doomed the effort.
Further, the experience indicated that prospects for future
success were dim.
While additional state funding was the preferred choice of
the regional school district in obtaining support to preserve the
Institute, the possibility of merger with another institution was
not unacceptable.

Since the Institute was publicly supported, a
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merger with another public institution appeared logical.

Since

the Institute awarded an associate degree, merger with a community
college seemed most appropriate.

Finally, since most of the

towns in the regional school district are in the Massasoit
Community College primary service area, it was a logical choice to
consider for a possible merger.
The two strategies were pursued simultaneously for a period.
However, vdien the attempt to secure additional state funds failed
for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1984, the possibility of a
merger became more attractive and negotiations began in earnest in
the fall of 1984.
In an abstract sense, the major problem confronting
administrators at Massasoit and Blue Hills was to understand each
other and the organizational change they were pursuing.
merger?

What is a

Are there historical antecedents to provide guidance in

this situation?
College?
education?

What are the traditions at Massasoit Community

How did a regional school district enter postsecondary
Are there specific issues in mergers of public

institutions and matters of public policy to consider?

Is there a

model to follow in such merger situations?
Mergers
At the time the merger was being negotiated, a review of the
literature was undertaken by administrators at Massasoit in an
effort to understand the corporate change being sought by the two
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institutions.

Surprisingly the search revealed little material

that could be of assistance in defining the issues in mergers.

By

far the majority of the literature dealt with private sector
mergers of business enterprises.

The focus of these studies was

financial or economic and was concerned with markets, equities and
stock values.

In the instant absence of these market factors,

this literature was not helpful in understanding public sector
mergers in higher education.
There was some literature on mergers of nonprofit
institutions other than colleges and universities; however, this
literature was specialized and offered little in the attempt to
understand mergers in public higher education.

The content of

this literature was restricted to the status of hospitals and
other nonprofit institutions with very specific missions.
After winnowing down the literature on mergers to higher
education there was only a small sample of material.

Gail

Chambers [1987] notes that one reason for the lack of literature
in higher education mergers is the difference in treatment between
business and higher education.

In the private sector the term

merger is a key descriptor and reasearch can appropriately begin
using the term.

However, merger for nonprofit organizations can

be seen as growth or consolidation, or simply institutional
history.

As a result she found that in higher education the fact

of merger may be discussed in detail with scant reference to
merger in an indexing sense.
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In reviewing the available descriptive studies of merger in
higher education, one categorical factor emerges:

The distinction

between public and private control of the corporate educational
enterprise is a fundamental criteria.

In higher education this

distinction is basic since the locus of corporate control varies
substantially between the private and the public sectors.
It was only subsequent to the Massasoit - Blue Hills merger
that an analytical work was prepared by Gail S. Chambers in a
doctoral dissertation at the Itoiversity of Rochester.
work. Merger Between Private Colleges:

Her 1987

An Empirical Analysis,

provides a thorough analytic study of mergers among private
colleges in the 1970's.

Ms. Chambers, too, was alarmed at the

lack of literature regarding mergers.

She felt the prospect of

merger would more likely affect private colleges than public
sector institutions because the nature of private college
financial support was more tenuous.
She was particularly concerned that there was little in the
way of supporting generalization to guide those in the private
sector vdio may need to consider the merger option or any of its
less extreme corollaries.

"Therefore the merger of private

colleges was studied here in the hope that vhat could be learned
about institutions it^rging by choice might add to the wisdom with
v^ich mergers and other forms of cooperative ventures can be
designed in a period of rapid change to create a more
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usefiil and endioring higher education system"

[p. 2].

While her

focus was exclusively on the private sector, she suggests that
understanding voluntary private college mergers may contribute to
understanding public college mergers as well.
Dr. Chambers chose to look quantitatively at private college
mergers through the 1970's in an effort to determine vrtiat
characterized the choice process vdiich ultimately resulted in
merger.

Her research question was to identify what factors would

contribute to the probability of a successful merger.

She chose

to attempt to generalize by using a mathematical
(axiomatic^eductive-econometric) model in this effort.
When the actual merger cases and their
geographic alternatives are viewed as a
whole... we see a general pattern of
decision characteristics in v^ich the
institutions sort partners first
according to certainties about debt
structure and the risks of being
dominated, then by more complex means.
The possibility of getting a campus at
bargain rates or the opportunity to
stabilize and re-negotiate debt can make
pairing seem more attractive in the ecurly
stages of the merger negotiations, [p. 179]
As one moves from consideration of debt structure and the
possibility of one institution to dominating another financially,
reputational differences based on degree levels (one way the
academic community measures its own professional worth) became
more significant.

The impact of the reputational difference may

be positive in a situation of expansion with the addition of
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academic programs or increased efficiency, or it may be negative
in a retrenchment situation because of duplicative academic
programs which may threaten the participant's professional
employment,

[p. 180]

In concluding her study of private college mergers Cliambers
found that institutional self-interest had condensed itself into
an identification with the general public welfare.

"Regardless of

the pressures placed on the government structure of our private
institutions, then, v^en it comes right down to it, apparently
they choose first, and last, to fulfill their p\jiblic trust."
[p. 187]
Joseidi O'Neill and Samuel Barnett (1980) have summarized the
issues involved in the legal change of corporate status.

Their

focus was primarily on small, tuition dependent private colleges;
however, their study of the legal description of corporate change
appears generally applicable in all of higher education.

O'Neill

and Barnett found several major forms of corporate change:
merger, federation, change of sponsorship, dissolution, and re¬
incorporation .
In a consolidation merger, two or more corporations dissolve
their respective legal identities and beccane a vholly new
corporation carrying forth all the properties and obligations of
the former corporations.

A dissolution/acquisition merger

involves an agreement under which one institution is legally

10

dissolved and its assets and liabilities are acquired with court
approval by the surviving institution.

Thus, there are two forms

of merger, consolidation and dissolution/acquisition.
Their findings in reviewing the legal aspects of merger are
not inconsistent with those of Chambers:

"Questions of academic

program, faculty quality, and reputation can be resolved only
after it is clear that a merger will not hurt the stronger
institution financially.

The bottom line will be the first

consideration of a responsible board."

[p. 28]

O'Neill and

Barnett also find a legal justification for the action in the
notion of public trust noted by Chambers:

"Trustees are, above

all else, the holders in trust of an estate provided by others for
the benefit of society.

Consequently, their first obligation in

law is to that estate and to the successful completion of the
institution's mission."

[p. 28]

Institutions do not exist in isolation, interdependence and
cooperation is the norm.

It is helpful in understanding the

notion of it^rger to conceive of a continuum of inter-institutional
relationships:

on one end would be the purchase or sale of

products and materials from one institution by another, and on the
other end of the continuum one would find consortia, joint
ventures and finally, mergers.

A merger, then, would represent

the ultimate in corporate cooperation.
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A focus on the segment of this continuum covering cooperative
behavior and mergers would eliminate the trivial from this concept
of continuum.

On the left side of this continuum would be

voluntary cooperation between or among institutions.

These

institutional arrangements are characterized in higher education
by agreements for sharing facilities and/or programs, but in which
each of the institutions would clearly retain its own identity.
Formalized consortia would occupy the middle ground in this
continuum where agreements of various strengths would occur.

A

formalized consortium would be of the type described by Franklin
Patterson [1974] in Colleges in Consort as cooperative and
service-oriented consortia.

Typically these consortia

arrangements represent institutional combinations through formal
agreement such as the Claremont Colleges in California.
At the right side of the continuum one would find mergers
characterized

specific and marked organizational change.

Exairples of these would be the creation of Camegie-Mellon
University from Carnegie Tech and the Mellon Institute and the
merger the College of the Sacred Heart into Boston College.
In the realm of higher education there is some specific
literature dealing with mergers of private colleges.

There is

also the concept that a merger represents the ultimate form of
corporate cooperation.

Since it is possible to conceive of merger

as representing one end of a continuum of inter-institutional
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relationships, is it also possible to consider movement along this
continuum from various types of cooperative ventures toward and
concluding in a merger?
Neither the Chambers' analysis nor the O'Neill and Barnett
legal study indicate any pattern of movement from various
cooperative ventures toward merger.

Perhaps the salient element

here is the organizational need for autonomy which may predominate
given the lack of financial considerations.

Franklin Patterson

found in 1974 that cooperative consortia did not tend to develop
into more significant joint educational planning and operation:
"Even in the best of these (cooperative consortia) institutional
autonomy and self-interest remains the predominate pattern, and
cooperative patterns appear thin." [p. 28]

Patterson's

observation in his study of cooperative consortia appears to be
confirmed in the applicable literature regarding mergers.
Earlier it was noted that the literature with mergers as the
primary focus in higher education is scarce.

There are a number

of articles available idiich are essentially descriptive and in
vdiich there is no attempt to generalize.
catergorized as "how to" works.

Many of these could be

They are usually based on

specific mergers and the authors provide a laundry list of items
to be considered for those considering a merger.

There is nothing

in these descriptive works vdiich places the experience reported in
any greater context.

It remains for the reader to determine which
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characteristics on the list are idiosyncratic and which are
applicable to the sitiiation at hand.

These works may be useful as

a data base for preparing generalizations, but in and of
themselves are of little abstract use.

Exanples of this genre

include several chapters in a text edited by Asa Knowles [1970] as
well as an article by Hugh L. Thompson [1985], "Considering a
Merger?"
Of those works v^ch are considered generally descriptive,
one in particular looms large.

A 1976 book by John D. Millett

entitled Mergers in Higher Education:

An Analysis of Ten Case

Studies was an effort to review a variety of mergers to identify
commonalities among them.

It is not an analytic work in the sense

that an attempt is made to place these mergers in a larger
context; however, the conclusions Millett draws are most helpful
in any study of mergers.

Millett's stijdy is significant also

because it represents the only published book in general
circulation available as a study of mergers in higher education.
In the ten cases Millett studied during the 1970's, five were
mergers of private institutions and five were mergers of public
institutions.

He chose the institutions studied to represent the

variety of merger ejqserience in higher education.
It is significant that Millett's conclusion, as was Chambers'
and O'Neill and Barnett's, established the essential motivation
for merger as financial:

"In every instance we have studied.
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financial concems were a major reason for moving toward merger,
but the financial concems were not necessarily those of an
immediate income - expenditure gap.

The financial concern might

arise from a determination to achieve greater financial strength
for a combined institution than was possible for a each
institution separately."

[p. 9]

If there is a common thread in

the literature of mergers, it is that financial concems represent
a precipitating factor in movement toward merger.
Millett finds other factors involved in merger as well.
Geographic proximity, for example, was inportant in considerations
of merger.

"Geography is more than a matter of location.

Geography is also the formalized basis of political representation
in the American structure of government."

[p. 14]

In

consideration of public sector mergers the political
representation factor is not to be lightly regarded.

The

geographic factor is also characteristic of institutions of higher
education in the United States.
they have a national reputation.

There are somehow local even if
Harvard is a Cambridge,

Massachusetts institution in spite of its enrollment of students
from around the world and its dispersion of graduates throughout
the lAiited States and the world.

The authorization to

award

degrees resides at the state level, and perhaps for that reason
colleges and universities are all in that sense local.
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Earlier it was suggested that there is a continuum of interinstitutional relationships from cooperative ventures to merger.
Millett finds that a pattern of cooperation could possibly have
some influence in encouraging an eventual merger of two
institutions, although what that influence might be was
problemmatical.

Of his ten case studies, there was soitte evidence

of cooperation in four but no evidence of cooperation in six
instances.

He found no definitive movement along a continuum from

cooperation toward merger in the several instances where there was
evidence of cooperation prior to the merger event.
Millett also found that other factors were prominent in the
decision to merge:

The movement frcsn education for women to co¬

education, variations in program emphasis, and qualitative
considerations in a movement toward academic excellence.

These

characteristics, however, appear to be significant in certain
specific institutional instances and were not generalizable.
Regarding merger in the public sector, however, he finds that
political interests are iirportant:

"It is reasonable to

generalize that any merger involving state government funding or
state government legislative action is necessarily a merger made
possible only

political considerations involving the various

parties to the transaction.

Governmental action is politics, and

mergers of higher educational institutions sometimes can and do
involve governmental action" [pp. 22-23].
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Of all the issues in merger, Millett stresses again that
financial considerations are at the base of mergers, both public
and private.

"But underneath, or inherent in, any consideration

of merger is some particular financial concern, and some
particular calculation of financial benefit" [p. 23].

He finds

that of all the forces available in movement toward merger,
finances represent the final and determining influence.
In Millett's study two factors regarding the movement toward
merger in the public sector appear salient:
considerations and politics.

financial

While Millett notes the iirportance

of governmental action and, hence, political action, he seems
consider political action only as a means to resolve financial
problems.

That is, he does not appear to consider the larger

issue of public policy in the merger of public institutions.
His focus on institutions rather than public policy is
reflected in his summary of the major purposes of the mergers he
studied:
* To obtain support for the \irban mission of previously
independent univerisites
To strengthen quality
' To consolidate complimentary institutions in the
interest of more economical operation and unified
management
* To meet financial difficulties and to liquidate debts
* To preserve some identity of a caitpus and academic
operation [p. 53]
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Summary
Millett's study, v^le very helpful, is essentially
descriptive.

The perspective is quite institution oriented, as if

these institutions were not part of a larger segment of higher
education either at the state or national level.

It was noted

earlier that mergers in the business sector are influenced by the
larger context of the economic environment and market forces in
v^ich those institutions exist.

In a review of the literature of

mergers in public higher education there appears to be no specific
consideration of the larger context within which these
institutions exist.
In this study of the merger of Massasoit Community College
and the Blue Hills Technical Institute it will be necessary to
study other public sector mergers in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.
mergers.

To that end the focus of Chapter Two will be two

First is the merger of two textile institutes vrtiich

ultimately resulted in Southeastern Massachusetts University.

The

second merger is the combination of Lowell State College and
Lowell Technological Institute vrtiich brought about the University
of Lowell.

Both of these mergers were completed prior to creation

of the Massachusetts Board of Regents of Higher Education in 1981.
Immediately after the creation of the Board of Regents of
Higher Education came the nerger of Boston State College and the
Ikiiversity of Massacdiusetts at Boston into the expanded University
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of Massachusetts at Boston, which will be the focus of Chapter
Three in this study.

Chapter Four will cover the merger of

Massasoit Community College and the Blue Hills Technical
Institute.

The concluding chapter will provide an informal

analysis and observations arising from this study of public sector
mergers.
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CHAPTER 2
MASSACHUSETTS MERGERS, 1964 AND 1975
Introduction
Mergers in public higher education in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts occurred in 1964, 1975, 1981, and 1984.

The mergers

that occurred in 1964 and 1975 involved combinations of contiguous
institutions with canplimentary purposes.

These institutions had

their origins in the late 19th century.
In the 1890's the textile industry was a prominent econcMidc
activity in Massachusetts.
activity:

There were two major areas of

southeastern and northeastern Massachusetts.

The mills

in southeastern Massachusetts were primarily concerned with cotton
textiles vdiile those in northeastern Massachusetts chiefly
concentrated on the woolen textile industry.
At the initiation of the local ccmimunities, three textile
schools were formed to support the area industry.

The New Bedford

Textile School, Bradford-Durfee Textile School (Fall River), and
the Textile School at Lowell were established through the
authority provided in acts of the Legislature.

These institutions

were originally supported and funded by the local communities;
however, state operational support quickly followed and soon
outpaced local contributions to the budget of each institution.
These institutions had as the reason for their existence a highly
specific textile manufacturing related curriculum.

As the

textile industry began its withdrawal from M^sachxisetts, these
schools began to diversify their educational offerings.

The

textile schools originally awarded diplomas, but as the years
rolled by they started awarding three year certificates and
finally four year baccalaureate degrees.

As the institutions

became less directly related to the textile industry and more a
part of traditional higher education, their existence distinct
from the mainstream of public higher education in the Commonwealth
became problematic.
At the same time the textile schools were created, there was
also an expansion of the state normal school system for teacher
training.

In 1894 the state normal school at Lowell was

authorized by the Legislature, and its doors were opened in
October, 1897.

The institution offered a two year program in

elementary education but its curriculum expanded several times
over the next eight decades.

The state normal schools were

authorized in 1932 to confer a baccalaureate degree, and the naites
of the institutions were changed from normal schools to state
teachers colleges.

In 1960 the institutions were renamed state

colleges and were provided with an es^panded mission of providing
programs in research, extension and continuing education and in
the liberal, fine and applied arts and sciences through the
masters degree level.
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These textile schools and the state college in Lowell were
involved in the first major mergers of pijblic institutions of
higher education in the Ccanmonwealth.

In 1964 the Southeastern

Massachusetts Technological Institute was created by the
combination of the New Bedford Textile School and the BradfordDurfee Textile School.

In 1975 the University of Lowell

was

created by the combination of Lowell State College and the Lowell
Technological Institute.
Southeastern Massachusetts University (1964)
Walter J. Cass [1967] provides a substantial report of the
history of the creation of vdiat is now known as the Southeastern
Massachusetts University (SMU) in his cultural perspective of the
contribution of the institution to the development in the area.
The institution was originally called the Southeastern
Massachusetts Technological Institute (SMIT) ^en it was formed in
1964.
The Bradford-Durfee Textile School was created to give
instruction in textile manufacturing.

The city of Fall River was

the primary source of financial support from its origins until
1918 when the Commonwealth of Massachusetts assumed the principal
financial support of the institution.

Governance from 1918 until

the merger in 1964 was by a Board of Trustees of fifteen members
appointed by the Governor for three year terms and three
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ex officio members (Commissioner of Education, Mayor of Fall
River, and Superintendent of Fall River Public Schools).

From

1918 ^en the Commonwealth eissumed title to school property and
carried the financial burden, the city of Fall River provided
$10,000 a year for the support of the school until the date of
merger.
The curriculum at Bradford-Durfee Textile School included a
three year couorse in general cotton manufactviring, a two year
course in designing and weaving, as well as a two year course in
chemistry and dyeing.

In 1946 the textile school became the

Bradford-Durfee Technical Institute and in 1955 it was renamed the
Bradford-Durfee College of Technology.

As Cass notes, "The

changes in name reflect the changes in educational function that
the school was undergoing.

The courses in machine shop,

electricity, and mill construction had slowly, through the years,
developed into mechaniccd., electrical, and civil engineering.

The

courses in dyeing and finishing developed into a chemistry
department" [p. 87].

The primeury inpetus for this development

from a curriculum stan^)oint had to do with the specific nature of
the training at the school.

It proved difficult to separate the

teaching of textile machine design from general machine design,
hence creating the tendency toward generalization vrtiich is
reflected in this change of the school's status in the 1940's and
1950's.
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Of course much of this change in the educational offering of
Bradford-Durfee can be traced to the migration of the cotton
textile industry from southeastern Massachusetts to the southern
United States.

Cass, however, suggests that these changes would

have occurred even if the textile indiistry had remained strong in
the history of Fall River.

"The old concept of the textile

colorest held until the introduction of sophisticated dyes and
finishes by Dupont and other chemical conpanies" [p. 88].

The

application of colors to textiles thus became more a matter of the
science of chemistry than a matter for tradesmen mixing certain
standard materials in a way which would produce a desired effect.
Bradford-Durfee's movement toward collegiate status is best
reflected in its effort to receive full accreditation.

Through

the 1940 *s and 1950's the institution developed a curriculum
beyond textiles to include major fields of study in engineering,
mathematics, chemistry, business administration, and graphic arts.
In addition a humanities department

Wcis

developed and a new

science building with appropriate laboratories was completed in
1955.

These activities "...moved toward a more generalized,

theoretical education and away from a specific, job centered,
vocational education" [Cass, p. 100].

The Bradford-Durfee

College of Technology applied to the New England Association of
Schools and Colleges (NEASC) for accreditation in June of 1961 and
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was evaluated that fall.

In December of 1961 the NEASC notified

the institution of its successful accreditation.
The New Bedford Institute of Technology also applied for and
received accreditation from the New England Association of Schools
and Colleges.

The history of the New Bedford Textile School

through 1964 was quite similar to that of the Bradford-Durfee
Textile School.

The purpose of the New Bedford Textile School

to provide teaching for the manufacture of cotton textiles.

Wcis

The

New Bedford school was created by an act of the Massachusetts
Legislature in 1895 and in 1918 became a state institution, as did
the Bradford-Durfee Textile School.

In 1918 the Commonwealth

assumed financial responsibility for the support of the sdiool
while the city of New Bedford continued to contribute $10,000 a
year to its support through 1964.

The institution was governed by

a seventeen (17) member board of trustees with fifteen (15)
appointed by the Governor and two (2) ex officio members, the
Mayor of New Bedford and the New Bedford Superintendent of
Schools.

The board of trustees was e5q>anded several years later

to include the Commissioner of Education as an ex officio number.
The curriculum at the New Bedford Textile School reflected
the organization of a cotton mill and the craft-oriented trades of
the time.

The school had four departments:

the cotton carding

and spinning department, the warp preparation and weaving
department, the design departit^nt, and the mechanical drawing
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department [Cass, p. 119].

The curriculum remained substantively

in place as late as 1947.
In the years immediately following World War II the New
Bedford Textile School changed as did the Bradford-Durfee School.
The New Bedford Textile School underwent name dianges similar to
those of Bradford-Durfee reflecting changes in the purpose of the
institution.

Until 1949 the institution was referred to as New

Bedford Textile School.

The New Bedford Textile Institute was its

title in 1950, and in 1955 it became the New Bedford Institute of
Tfextiles and Technology.

Textiles was dropped from its title in

1957 when it became the New Bedford Institute of Technology.
The name changes here reported suggest that
the New Bedford School in its last years of
independence and existence tried to remain
loyal at least to the technology if not
textile designation of its original
institutional goals. The word "college"
in Bradford-Durfee's name suggests a
more academically oriented approach to
essentially the same area of education.
This seems to be a fair assessment of
differences in aim of the two institutions
in practice. In its later years. New
Bedford Institute of Technology continued
a close relationship with industry and
tended to view many of its courses, even
after becoming a degree granting institution,
"training for industry." Probably because
Fall River had been more thoroughly deserted
indxistry than had New Bedford,
Bradford-Durfee seen^d to move more in the
direction of a collegiate, i.e.,
non-technologic education. [Cass, pp. 122-123]

26

To the detached observer, the two textile schools in Fall
River and New Bedford appear quite similar in their purposes.

In

addition, although they were founded on local initiative, their
operational support came from the larger political arena, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

There was little cooperative

interaction between the two institutions just as there was little
cooperation between the two cities which have historically
maintained a healthy rivalry.
Movement toward merger occurred in 1947 when a bill to
consolidate the two schools was introduced into the state
legislature.

"The object of the bill was to avoid the continued

costly duplication of facilities, machines, faculty, and courses
in two similar state institutions only 16 miles apart"
p. 86].

[Cass,

The bill was sponsored by the State Commission on

Adminstration and Finance and the State Auditor in an effort to
reduce the cost of state government.
legislature defeated the bill.

Local opposition in the

However, the concept remained

alive in state administrative circles.
The effort to merge Bradford-Durfee College and New Bedford
Institute of Technology began in earnest with Governor Foster
Furcolo's Special Message to the legislature on July 1, 1958.
addition to proposing the merger of these two institutions, the
Governor more broadly advocated the establishment of two year
community colleges, the expansion of the University of
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In

Massachusetts at Amherst, and the enlargement of the State
Teachers' Colleges.

The Governor's Special Message was a

comprehensive plan for the e3q>ansion of public higher education in
the Commonwealth.
In the proposal to merge the two textile schools, the
Governor clearly rejected separate e3q>ansion of these two
complimentary institutions which were also geographically close to
each other.

It simply made no sense from the state perspective to

support e3q>ansion of these schools separately.
Opposition to the Governor's plan did emerge in both cities.
In one sense there was the traditional loyalty of the New Bedford
and Fall River areas to their local schools.

It cannot be

overlooked that these institutions were created at local
initiative and were sustained through their history by some local
financial support.

The Board of Trustees consisted of local

citizens and scholarships were provided to promising students from
the area.

Local pride must be considered in the context of the

traditional New Bedford - Fall River inter-city rivalry which
historically stood in the way of any cooperative efforts between
the cities.

These issues set the tone for the opposition v^ich

also included a healthy mistrust of state government.
Southeastern Massachusetts has traditionally felt itself
slighted

hy

state initiatives.

Indeed, Walter J. Cass associates

the fate of the area with its distance from center of power in
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Boston, Massachusetts.

"Southeastern Massachusetts has learned to

expect that Boston and vicinity consume the lion's share of state
aid on all projects, educational or otherwise, and that after
Boston, the Worcester and North Shore areas of the state have
priority.

The leftovers, if any, are allocated to southeastern

Massachusetts.

The combined annual budgets of New Bedford Textile

School and Bradford-Durfee Textile School never equalled the
annual budgets of Lowell"

[p. 76].

The Governor had to build a political consensus for his
proposal.

At one point in the debate over the consolidation of

the two textile schools, an alternative was proposed to make one
of the institutions (Bradford-Durfee) a two year college and
expand the New Bedford Institution.

This met with considerable

opposition but appeared to focus the political debate in a
direction preferred by the Governor.
The options available at the local level appeared to be to
continue the present separate institutional arrangements with no
e3q>ansion, e3q>ansion which included the creation of a two year
college by one, or the acceptance of a consolidated institution as
orginally proposed by the Governor.

The Governor's proposal of

two alternatives with highly negative implications appeared to
focus group support for the consolidation plan of creating a
Southeastern Massachusetts Technological Institute.
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After

establishing this Hobson's choice, the Governor commented that he
would accede to local interests.
Local proponents of a merger participated in the effort to
build popular support for the creation of a university.

William

C. Wild, then a faculty member and Special Assistant to the
President at Bradford Durfee, and now Executive Vice President at
SMU, notes that people had to be sold on the merits of the issue.
Dr. Wild, along with a member of New Bedford's Board of Trustees,
would speak at local functions such as PTA and service club
meetings citing the advantages of merger and the disadvantages of
failure to merge.

He recalls that Governor Furcolo's Special

^fessage propelled the idea of merger to center stage, but that
local pride had to be assuaged.
Local support was high for each institution because of long
term ties to each ccanmunity.

It was not insignificant that each

Board of Trustees was cotrposed of local citizens, that
institutional scholarships were awarded to local students, and
that each community consistently contributed $10,000 annually to
the budget of the institutions through good financial times and
bad.

The theme stressed by Dr. Wild and others was the broadening

of educational opportunity for area students beyond textiles and
related engineering programs.

The prospect of expanded

educational opportunity, sounded by Governor Furcolo, proved
compelling in overcoming local resistance and the
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New Bedford-Fall River inter-city rivalry.

[William C. Wild,

personal communication, March 6, 1989]
The Governor built a consensus for a consolidated institution
so that on March 10, 1960, at a joint meeting of the Board of
Trustees, the two textile schools agreed to campaign for a
consolidated institution.

In a May, 1960 Special Message to the

Legislature the Governor asked for an appropriation for the
establishment of Southeastern Massachusetts Technological
Institute.

The bill was referred to the Joint Committee on

Education in the legislature vdiich approved the bill and referred
it for action.

The bill received the support of both houses and

was signed by the Governor on July 8, 1960.
The 1960 action by the legislature ultimately resulted in the
merger of the two textile schools and the creation of Southeastern
Massachusetts Technological Institute in July, 1964.

The new

institution was to be located on a new campus in North Dartmouth,
Massachusetts, midway between Fall River and New Bedford.
An assessment of the precipitating factors in the merger and
creation of Southeastern Massachusetts University must first
incliide the dominant influence of Governor Foster Furcolo.

It was

the Governor's intiative to ejqpand public higher education in
order to provide greater educational opportunity throughout the
state which brought about the merger of the two textile schools.
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The combination was one aspect of his effort to e:5>and the
Commonwealth's public higher education commitment.
The merger of these two textile schools, only 16 miles apart
with duplicative programs, made estimable public policy sense.
From a financial perspective, there was no coirpelling need for the
Commonwealth to conffnit funds for the expansion of either of these
institutions.

The Governor made it clear in establishing the

organizational alternatives to the local area that if they were to
ride the crest of expanding public higher education in the state,
they could do so in the manner prescribed in his special message.
Care should be taken, however, in assigning too much weight
in the push toward merger of the two institutions to the factual
circumstance of conplimentary programs and geographic proximity.
Recently Governor Furcolo suggested that the notion of access to
public higher education by citizens of the area was key.

He

suggested that southeastern Massachusetts had been neglected by
the state in general and specifically in regard to public higher
education.

What choice other than education for the textile

industry did an area high school graduate have?

There were no

local public higher education options available to area students
other than the two schools.

If a student did not want to pursue a

textile or technical related career, there was no opportunity in
the area.

In his Special Message of 1958 he purposefully provided

for an expansion of educational opportunity in southeastern
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Massachusetts, not the elimination of duplicative institutions.
Public policy, it seems, was the logic behind the events that led
to the creation of SMU [Foster G. Furcolo, personal communication,
January 25, 1989].
The issues in the creation of the merger, then, can be traced
directly to Governor Furcolo’s policy intiatives as well as the
geographical proximity of the two institutions with conplimentary
programs.

Students were pleased with the proposal since the

combination of the institutions would lead to a four year entity
of greater prestige.

All personnel at the two institutions were

by statute provided with the right to be ertployees of the newly
consolidated entity and all property in the possession of the two
institutions separately would be deeded to the new SMIT.
Governance, too, was established in the 1960 statute in a way that
gave equal representation to the two communities.
Earlier noted was a proposition concerning a continuum of
inter-organizational cooperation.

In this instance of merger

there seems to be no movement along a continuum of interinstitutional cooperation.

That is, there were no progressive

stages of cooperative effort that preceded the iterger of the two
institutions.

From separate and duplicative institutions with

little interaction came a single university.
University of Lowell (1975)
Lowell State College and the Lowell Technological Institute
were merged in July of 1975 as a result of legislation enacted in
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1973.

Until this combination these two institutions existed just

one mile apart in the city of Lowell trcm the time of their
developonnent in the 1890's.
Lowell State College was one of eleven insitutions in the
Massachusetts State College System, all of which were founded
before 1900, nine of them as normal schools.

An 1838 act of the

legislature authorized the State Board of Education to establish
three normal schools in different geographic locations of the
state.

The present Framingham, Westfield, and Bridgewater State

Colleges all trace their existence to this original legislation.
The Normal School at Lowell opened its doors in 1897.
The Massachusetts State College System also included two
specialized colleges.

The Massachusetts College of Art (1873) was

the first normal art school in the United States and the
Massachusetts Maritime Academy (1891) was founded to provide
officers for the

U.S. Iferchant Marine.

Both of these

institutions were governed by a separate Board of Trustees.
In 1909, the nine Normal Schools were placed under the direct
supervision of the State Department of Education.

They were

authorized to grant the Bachelor of Education Degree in 1921 and
the Bachelor of Science in Education in 1922.

In 1932 these

Normal Schools were formally designated State Teachers Colleges.
In 1935 they were authorized to confer the Master of Education
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degree, the principal degree offered by Lowell State College at
the time of merger.
During the 1950's, a number of studies of academic programs
at the Massachusetts State Teachers Colleges recommended the
development of a broader curricula and the construction of more
physical facilities.

In 1960 the colleges were renamed State

Colleges as they began to diversify fields of study.

Bachelor

degree programs in most of the liberal arts and several
porofessional areas were implemented as result of the
recommendation to diversify.
The curriculum at Lowell State College reflected this
movement toward diversification, although it retained its
historical emphasis on music education.

By 1972 the College

continued to offer three teaching programs in Elementary, Music,
and Secondary Education and baccalaureate degrees in sixteen
programs:

American Studies, Art, Biology, English, Environmental

Sciences, French, History, Mathematics, Medical Technology, Modem
Languages, Music, Nursing, Philosophy, Political Science,
Psychology, and Sociology.

Masters degree programs were available

in teaching programs only.
Through 1964, the State Board of Education served as the
Board of Trustees for the Massachusetts State Colleges.

The

College of Art and the Maritime Academy accreted to the State
College System under the Board of Education in 1964.
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The

Willis-Harrington Act of 1965 conpletely reorganized piablic
education in Massachusetts.

The 1965 Act placed the eleven

colleges under the authority of an autonomous governing board, the
Board of Trustees of the State Colleges, effective on January 25,
1966.

This segmental Board of Trustees provided the primary

oversight of Lowell State College from 1966 until July 1, 1975,
the date of merger with Lowell Technological Institute.
The Lowell Textile School also opened its doors in 1897 for
the purpose of teaching textile technology subjects.

The

historical development of the Lowell Textile School closely
parallels that of the Bradford Durfee and New Bedford Textile
Schools in southeastern Massachusetts.

The Lowell Textile School

was authorized originally to award diplomas and certificates and
in 1913 was granted the additional permission to confer four year
degrees in engineering and textile chemistry.

As with its

southeastern Massachusetts counterparts, the Lowell Textile School
came under the control and management of a Board of Trustees
appointed by the Governor in 1918 vrtien the school property and
operational support became the responsibility of the Commonwealth.
The name of the institution was changed in 1928 to the Lowell
Textile Institute.
The Lowell Textile Institute expanded its degree programs
through the late 1940's and the early 1950's to a much broader
science based curriculum.

There were degree programs in
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Biological Science, Business Administration, Oiemical Engineering,
Civil Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Industrial Management
and Technology, Mathematics, Mechanical Engineering, Meteorology,
Nuclear Engineering, Physics, Plastics, and Radiological Health
Physics.

This e^qpanded curriculum lead to another name change in

1953 to the Lowell Technological Institute.

Hie Institute offered

Associate Degrees in Business Administration, Bachelor of Science,
Master of Mathematics for teachers and Doctor of Philosophy
degrees.
The Lowell Technological Institute received generally greater
si^port from the Commonwealth than the two textile schools in
southeastern Massachusetts.

Of the three schools, Lowell became

most famous and earned a notable reputation originally as a
technical school associated with the textiles and later as a
teaching and research center related to the development of
industry around the city of Boston.

[Cass, p. 75]

Just as the merger that created Southeastern Massachusetts
lAiiversity was primarily the result of public policy initiatives
at the state level, the impetus for the creation of the University
of Lowell came from the state level, this time from the State
Legislature.

A special commission was established by Chapter 79

of the Resolves of 1972 to make an investigation and study
relative to the feasibility of merging the Lowell Technological
Institute of Massachusetts and the State College at Lowell.
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As a

result of this legislation, a merger study team was put together
and the Academy for Educational Development was hired as a
consulting firm to prepare a study on the feasiblity of merging
the two institutions.
1972.

This study was coirpleted in December of

This report of the special commission relative to the

feasibility of merging the Lowell Technological Institute of
Massachiisetts and the State College at Lowell was approved in
legislation enacted in 1973 and resulted in the iterger of the two
institutions on July 1, 1975.
At the time of the legislation which created the University
of Lowell, Lowell State College was an institution that
historically provided teacher education with an enphasis on music,
but vdiich had been adding degree programs in various liberal arts
subjects.

The Lowell Technological Institute was an entity vrtiich

built on its technical textile foundation to emphasize engineering
subjects as well as business administration and science.

Both

Lowell State and Lowell Tech were part of the Massachusetts state
system of higher education financed primarily by appropriations by
the state legislature.

Lowell State College was one part of the

state college system cind the Lowell Technological Institute had
its own separate Board of Trustees.
These two institutions with their complimentary programs were
located just over a mile apart in Lowell, Massachusetts.
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Throughout the history of both institutions there was little
evidence of cooperative efforts between them.
Joan Bartczak Cannon [1977] notes that each institution
developed its own unique institutional identity.

She reports that

the idea of the merger had been discussed unofficially for several
decades,

"...its initial impetus can be traced to 1969 vdien a

state representative from the local community submitted a bill
calling for the merger of these institutions."
State Representative Paul J. Sheehy [personal communication,
February 6, 1989]

and Lowell Technological Institute President,

Dr. Everett Olsen [personal communication, February 17, 1989]
provide an anecdotal explanation of the moving force behind the
idea of a merger.

Charley Sampas wrote a "Saiipas Scoopies" column

for the Lowell Sun at the time and often wrote that it would be
great for Lowell if the State College and Technological Institute
merged to create a university.

The story is not apocryphal for

Representative Sheehy vho reports that the Saitpas column made him
feel the idea was a good one.

Representative Sheehy filed the

1972 legislation that ultimately resulted in the merger that
created the University of Lowell.
There is little evidence that either institution vigorously
supported or encouraged the act of merger.

Indeed, a 1972

academic program master plan for the State College system in
Massachusetts fails to comment upon even the possibility of Lowell

39

state College becoming a part of a newly created University of
Lowell.

The master plan and the legislatively mandated

feasibility study were contenporaneously prepared, the former was
completed in November, 1972 and the latter in December, 1972.

The

impetus for merger in this instance, then, emerges from a state¬
wide perspective and not from either the systemic Board of State
Colleges or frcan the Board of Trustees of Lowell Technological
Institute.
■Hiere were two institutions of higher learning financed by
the State located in the city of Lowell.

These fundamental

circumstances call to mind those characteristics that earlier led
to the creation of Southeastern Massachusetts University.

A

common source of financial support for the institutions,
geographical proximity, and the complimentary nature of the
academic programs at the institutions represented a primary
rationale behind the introduction of the legislation to create the
lAiiversity of Lowell.
In a recent conversation Representative

(now Senator)

Sheehy

emphasized a theme that also calls to mind the discussion of
merger at SMU:

educational opportunity.

He suggests that Lowell

people of limited means, working people, could become teachers or
engineers but nothing else.

In the early 1970's jobs and career

opportunities in both areas were limited.

The whole reason for

the existence of public higher education is the opportunity for
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students to make their lives better.

A university in Lowell would

provide many more educational opportunities for the citizens of
Lowell than would the separate State College and Technological
Institute [Paul J. Sheehy, personal communication, February 6,
1989].
The merger study team created as a result of the March, 1972
legislation hired the Academy for Educational Developnnent (A.E.D.)
to construct a team of consultants under its auspices to evaluate
the possibility of merger.

The consultants were instructed to

consider the feasibility of merging the two institutions, to point
out the principal advantages and drav^backs of such an action, and
to identify the main considerations that would be involved in
carrying out a merger in the event that this was the course of
action decided upon.
Ihe merger study team ccarpleted its assignment promptly with
the acceptance of the consultants' report and summarized its
findings in a report prepared by the Academy for Educational
Developoodent sxjbmitted to the Legislature in December, 1972.

This

report brought the issue of merger to the fore and resulted in the
filing of merger legislation in January of 1973.
The study team was unanimous in its agreement that Lowell
State College and Lowell Technological Institute should be merged
into a new University of Lowell.
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The basic reason for this recommendation
is the firm conviction that the greater
Lowell community would be better served
from an educational point of view by the
comprehensive university that would result
in the merger, than it could possibly be
served if the two institutions went their
own independent way. A merger would make
much better use of the total resources,
both physiceO. and intellectual, would make
it possible to meet community needs more
effectively, and would avoid the costly
duplicated and destructive rivalry that
would otherwise be almost certain to
develop over the years. [A.E.D., p. 17]
The study team felt that while the future may hold cost
savings through more efficient utilization of plant and faculty,
there would be no immediate cost reduction.

Hiere would in the

short run still be the necessity to operate two locations and to
maintain the same facilities and, in their view, to continue the
existing student/faculty ratios.
The report included a concluding thought regarding an
alternative to merger:
merge?

cooperation.

Why not just cooperate?

It raised the questions. Why

"The answer is that without

unified leadership that gives overriding priority to the creation
of an organization that consolidates the operations of the
individual institutions, nothing much that is new will happen.
Hiese two institutions have lived side-by-side for seventy-five
years, and during this time under different leadership been quite
content to go their independent ways with negligible cooperation.
If a unified coordinated operation is wanted, the way to get is to
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imify the institution in actual fact_"

[A.E.D., p. 37].

The

answer to the question calls to mind Franklin Patterson's
observations regarding the autonomous and independent nature of
institutions of higher education.
The study team found little different to enphasize in its
recommendation than Representative Sheehy had noted earlier and
that was contained in the popular discussion of the preceding
several decades.

Ihose favorable circumstances leading toward

merger were geographical proximity and the complimentary nature of
the academic programs in state funded institutions.

The study

team downplayed the financial aspect of a merger but the prospect
of economies produced by a single administration and support
operation as enrollment grew held out the prospect of future
financial advantage.

Thus, while programmatic and public policy

issues were paramount in the consultants’ report, finances too
represented a consideration.
Dr. Everett Olsen recollects that he and the late Lowell
State College President Daniel O'Leary were supporters of the
merger v^en it became apparent that it was inevitable.

Dr. Olsen

recognized that as the compelling force behind merger became
educational opportunity, it was appropriate to go along with the
concept.

Local institutional issues of importance such as

salaries and job security suddenly appeared parochial in a context
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of greater educational opportunity [Dr. Everett Olsen, personal
cxstnmunication, February 17, 1989].
The A.E.D. report did not end merely with a recommendation
for merger.

It also included considerations to be made in

effecting a merger of the two colleges and recommended the
creation of a merger planning board.

Three of the suggestions

offered related to the nature of the merger:

It should be a

marriage of equals with neither teacher education nor technology
dominating.

It should be a merger in fact and not a paper

combination where a common chief executive oversees two
independent canpuses.

Finally, since Lowell State reported to a

segmental Board of Trustees, it was further recommended that the
separate Lowell Tech Board of Trustees be reconstituted to solve
the problems in creating a truly unified university [A.E.D.,
pp. 19-20].
Summary
In 1964 two former textile schools were combined to form
Southeastern Massachusetts University and in 1975 a former textile
school and a state college were merged to create the University of
Lowell.

There appear no salient characteristics intrinsic to the

four institutions that created a predisposition for merger.

The

academic performance of each institution was adequate, each was
following a reasonable pattern of curricular evolution, there were
no financial or operational problems threatening institutional
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survival, and each college had an administration, faculty,
students, and trustees generally satified with the status quo.

If

each institution is considered separately, as a discrete entity,
it is likely that little change would have occurred, save for
continued evolution.
Perhaps a question will clarify the point:

If one of the

institutions in each of the merger situations had not existed
would there have been substantive corporate change of equivalent
importance to merger?

The answer appears to be no.

The textile

schools were evolving into technological institutes worthy of
public support and were attracting students in sufficient numbers
to justify continued development.

The state college was emerging

as a liberal arts college in concert with the other state colleges
and this mission change broxight continued public support and
attracted students in growing numbers.

No internal constituency

at any of the four institutions clamored for substantive
organizational change, including merger.
The impetus for merger appears to be environmental.

All four

of the institutions were part of a system of public education and
it was the relationship of each institution to one another and to
the system as a vhole that precipitated merger.

The logic is

related to the development of public policy and the availability
of public higher educational opportunity.
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Each of the institutions drew its operational financial
support from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

It is not

surprising that the mergers were stimulated at the state level by
the Governor's Office and the Legislature.

Institutions of public

higher education in the Commonwealth have a great deal of
operational autonomy and function in a manner separate from other
segments of state government.

In addition, the public colleges

and universities identify with their educational mission as a part
of the larger world of higher education, with other public and
private colleges and universities, rather than other arms of state
government.

State government in this context represents more of a

source of operating and capital funds.

The identification with

the education profession may have resulted in a satisfaction with
the status quo that was appropriate; however, the perspective from
the State House was quite different.
It is in regard to public finances that geographic proximity
is likewise considered.

As long as there was a textile school and

a normal school, the distinct missions made it acceptable for
separate institutions to exist one mile apart.

The existence of

nearty institutions with a caramon mission of supporting the
textile industry in southeastern Massachusetts was acceptable as
well because of its contribution to the local area's economy.

As

the missions of these institutions began to converge over time,
the public esqjenditure issue became tied to the larger question of
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the support of public higher education.

The circumstance of

geographical proximity then became more important.

Why should the

public support two separate complimentary institutions of higher
education it«rely one mile or only sixteen miles apart?
Yet there is something beyond the irere facts of geography,
professional identification and a common source of support that
appears significant here.

A public policy of educational

opportunity waxed important in the final analysis of these two
mergers.

The concept of merger was afloat in the cities of Fall

River, New Bedford and Lowell long before the fact of merger, but
the idea attracted little support.

In a period of state and

national growth in public higher education, it was the
consolidation and estpansion of educational purpose as a matter of
public policy appears to be the compelling force behind the
combinations.

47

CHAPTER 3
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSEm'S AT BOSTCaj, 1982
Introduction
Just as environmental factors were inportant in the creation
of the Southeastern Massachusetts University and the University of
Lowell, matters of public policy, finance and geography were
similarly important in the merger of Boston State College and the
University of Massachusetts/Boston in 1982.

Yet this one act of

public policy, accomplished in a period of pxjblic tax cutting
initiatives and a controversial reorganization of public higher
education, engendered in those who participated in the resultant
merger such a strong anger and sense of unfairness that it lingers
today, eight years after the fact.

Those who did not participate

in the process of merger may find this feature somevrtiat
surprising, for by most outward signs the merger was both logical
and successful.

Where once in the city of Boston there existed

two public baccalaureate degree granting institutions, there is
now a single, strong university.
The merger of Boston State College and the University of
Massachusetts/Boston is an example of an overt act of public
policy and as such it is also a demonstration of the hegemony of
the political process vrtiich produces that public policy.

The

contrast betvreen the relatively tranquil mergers at Southeastern
Massachusetts University and the University of Lowell with that of

the University of Massachusetts at Boston in 1982 provides the
opportunity for additional insight into the phenomenon of mergers
in pLiblic higher education.
Boston State College
Boston State College began as the Boston Normal School in
1852.

It was created by an act of the Boston City Council in

July, 1852 to prepare young women to become teachers in the
grammar schools in the city of Boston.

The Boston Normal School

was the second city supported normal school in the Itoited States,
coming after a comparable normal school was established in
Philadelphia in 1848.
The normal school offered a one year course of study and
included such subjects as spelling, reading, arithmetic, english,
grammer, geography, history, drawing, vocal music, and
composition.

The curriculum also stressed the need for training

in high moral character.

There were eighty six young women

enrolled in the first class at the school.
In 1888 the normal school year was lengthened to one and onehalf years and in 1892 expanded again to two years.

By 1913 the

length of training was extended once more, this time to three
years.

In 1922 another change took place in Boston as it did

throughout the country when a fourth year was added to the
curriculum.

Another change occuorred in 1922 when the Great and

General Court authorized the Boston Normal School the authority to
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grant the Bachelor of Education degree to its graduates.

Ihe

Bostcxi Norroal School changed its name to the Teachers College of
the city of Boston \dien it became a member of the higher education
coraraunity.
Statistics compiled in 1922 indicate that in the preceding
fifty years there were 4,172 graduates of the Boston Normal
School.

In 1922, 1,970 of these graduates were working in the

Bostcxi public schools.

Boston Normal School was successful in

meeting its missicxi of producing teachers for the public schools
in the city of Bostai.
As a city siflpported Teachers College, the institution
continued its primary task of providing these teachers to the
Boston public schools throu^ 1952.
admitted to the Teachers College.

In 1948 the first men were
The instituticxi became a part

of the state supported system of higher educaticai in 1952 and
received funding through the state legislature, severing its
formal ties to the city.
Beginning in the 1950's the Boston State Teachers' College
was subject to the same pressure for changes in curriculum as the
other state colleges.

Studies recoirroended the development of

broader curricula and the constructicxi of additicaial j^ysical
facilities for state teachers colleges throu^out the State.

In

1960 the institution was renamed Boston State College to reflect
the continued diversification of academic programs of study.
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During the 1960's Boston State developed a variety of new degree
programs, mostly in the liberal arts, and in the 1970's began the
developnent of programs in the professions.
While Boston State College was changing its curriculum, the
institution retained through the late 60's much of the operating
style of normal school tradition.

John Moon [1983] notes as

follows:
Under the administration of the college's seventh
president. Dr. Willim F. Looney, 1948-1968, hiring
was largely carried out by the president who showed
a predilection for hiring graduates of Boston State
College, Boston College, and Boston University. At
that time, the College, described by its president
as an extended family, was ruled with an iron grip
by the Chief Executive vdio kept a faculty sign-in
and sign-out sheet outside his office, who called
male faculty members "boys" and female faculty
members "girlies" and who insisted the faculty
members should be present on campus from early
morning to late afternoon, five days a week...
Under Dr. Looney's administration, there was no
faculty senate structure, no hiring committees,
almost no department meetings, except at the
beginning of each academic year, when the virgins
were introduced to the tribe, [p.2]
Changes in the administration of the College began after the
resignation of Dr. Looney in 1968.

The Willis-Harrington

Reorganization Act of 1965 also mandated the creation of the
faculty senates at the state colleges, and in the years
immediately following Looney's tenure the faculty at Boston State
College organized for collective bargaining and joined the
American Federation of Teachers.
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The early 1970's saw a notable diminishment in the demand for
secondary school teachers and this had an immediate impact on
enrollment levels at Boston State College.

Similarly, there was a

lessening of demand for the newly created arts and sciences
programs that were created in the institutional transition to a
liberal arts college.
Rermit C. Morrissey was appointed president in 1971 and began
the development of professional programs at the College in
nursing, public service, urban studies and management.

He hired

new faculty, often part-time, to teach these programs.

This

approach continued through the 1970's and had the effect of
developing large, permanent faculty departments out of proportion
to the enrollment in academic programs.

Programmatic change was

not accompanied by a realignment of the Boston State faculty
workforce, but was accomplished through an incremental process
which brought many part-time faculty to the college.
John Moon [1983] observes that through this period of change
from normal school to state college to liberal arts college to
professional college, there was also no esprit developed at the
college of coiranitment to a common purpose similar to that which
had existed at the normal school.

In addition, a succession of

presidents failed to gain the confidence of the faculty and were
not able to define the identity nor defend the institution to the
public or to the political structure.
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Despite its long existence, therefore, the
College had failed to develop a recognizable
or respected presence through two decades of
tumultuous change, faculty revolt, faculty
quarrels, and student protests.
Instead,
still partly tarnished with a slur of "Huntington
High," its reputation was further stained by
the educational experiments of the 1960's and
the 1970's.
Its achievements, in becoming an
urban college, and steadily upgrading its faculty,
in providing low cost education and flexible
hours to working class students, were ignored.
[1983, p. 4]
The thirty years prior to the 1982 merger were difficult for
Boston State College.

It had not made a strong transition to a

liberal arts or professional college from a normal school, it
suffered from a diminished reputation, and it compared poorly to
the new and growing public university in the city.
Ikiiversitv of Massachusetts at Boston
The University of Massachusetts at Boston opened its doors to
1,200 students in 1965 in a temporary campus in downtown Boston.
Ibe University, created by an act of the legislature in 1964, had
the mission of serving the people of eastern M^sachusetts,
primarily the city of Boston, by providing a full range of
educational opportunities in post secondary education common to
those of other universities.

The institution opened with a

college of arts and sciences offering a standard curriculum.

The

original intent was to provide a high quality - a working man's
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Harvard - education for its students.

Faculty were recruited

based on terminal degrees and there was an enphasis on research
and publication.
Organizationally, there was a plan to create six separate
colleges of arts and sciences, and toward that end in 1971 faculty
were divided into two separate colleges, designated I and II, with
soroev^t different curricular patterns.

It was hoped that

eventually each of the six colleges would have an enrollment of
approximately 2,000 students.

The intent was to combine the

advantages of a small student population with the advantages of a
large university.

Hiis evolution did not take place as planned

and in 1976 colleges I and II were combined again into a college
of arts and sciences.
There was an effort to provide professional education at the
University as well.
1970’s.

Two professional colleges were created in the

The College of Public and Ccanmunity Service was started

in 1973 to serve an older and diverse clientele by offering a
competency based curriculum that combined preparation for public
service Ccureers with the liberal arts education.

In 1975 the

College of Professional Studies was created to offer programs in
the various fields of management.
to the College of Management.

The name was eventually changed

Construction of a permanent new

campus on Boston Harbor began in 1970 and was conpleted four years
later.

Most of the Ikiiversity's operation and academic programs
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were transferred to the harbor campus, although the College of
Public and Community Service remained in the original downtown
Park Square facility.
Graduate programs were likewise developed in the 1970's at
the University.

By 1982 the Ikiiversity offered the graduate

progams at the doctoral level in environmental sciences and at the
masters' level in American Civilization, Biology, Biotechnology,
Bioiitedical Science, Business Administration, Chemistry, Conputer
Science, Critical and Creative Thinking, English, History, Human
Services, Instructional Design, Physics, Public Affairs, and
Applied Sociology.

Some caution prevailed in the developnent of

graduate programs at the Boston canpus to avoid duplication of
similar programs at the Amherst canpus of the University.
The University of Massachusetts at Boston continued its
development and expansion throijgh the 1970's, although it lost
son® of the idealism inheroit in the notion of the six separate
colleges of liberal arts.

It was achieving growing recognition

and organizationally it reflected the prevailing form of other
universities throughout the country.

It was lacking only an

extensive offering of doctoral progams, but efforts were being
made to develop these as well.
The Itoiversity strove to place itself on its own standing as
a university, although such efforts were always made in the shadow
of the original state university in Amherst.
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The University of

Massachusetts at Boston made a concerted effort to provide public
university education to an urban population, attenpting to
preserve its university status commensurate with the Amherst
institution, yet serving a distinct and special mission in the
city of Boston.

Table one provides a limited comparison of Boston

State College and the University of Massachusetts at Boston in the
fall of 1981.

While this schedule demonstrates statistically that

the university was larger and had a better prepared student body,
there are several matters which mere numbers fail to reflect.
Table 1
Boston State and UMass Boston Descriptive Statistics. Fall 1981
Description

Boston State

UMass Boston

4,174
4,695
$13,400
26
83%
14.5%
13%

6,800
8,060
$16,100
25
87.9%

Enrollment:
Full-time equivalent
Headcount
Median family income
Average age
Percent white
Percent minority
Percent black

10.1%

7.3%

SAT Scores:
Verbal
Math
Total

360
389
749

434
466
900

270
36
130
436

399
139
376
914

Personnel Levels:
Faculty
Professional
Classified
Total
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^feraer
The 1982 merger that combined Boston State College with the
University of Massachusetts at Boston can best be understood in
the context of the public system of higher education in the
Commonwealth and the stresses on the system that en«rged
subsequent to the Willis-Harrington Act of 1965.

The Willis-

Harrington Act provided for a system of five segmental boards of
trustees for the lAiiversity of Massachusetts, Southeastern
Massachusetts Iftiiversity, the University of Lowell, the ten state
colleges and fifteen community colleges.
In addition to the five segmental boards there was a central
Board of Higher Education v^ich was responsible for the review of
budgetary requests frcan the segmental boards and for the
developanrtent of a master plan.

However, this overall board had

little real authority and never attained the staff necessary to
adequately review budgets or establish master plans.

Complicating

the issue of the role of the Board of Higher Education was the
creation of the position of Secretary of Education in a general
reorganization of the Commonwealth's governance structure in 1972.
As a result of the system of segmental boards and the
conflicting responsibilities between the Board of Higher Education
and the Secretary of Education, there was little overall
coordination of public higher education in the Conmonwealth.

The

fiscal crisis of the mid—1970's called this system into question.
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Each of the segmental boards had fiscal autonomy and a relatively
narrow mission.

The result was a wide variety of academic

programs but also an apparent duplication of effort in these
programs.

Indeed, any condition of cooperation between the

segnoits required the approval of both segmental boards of
trustees, each of which was concerned with the inportance of its
own mission and hence guarded its own prerogatives with care.
Hiere were several early trial balloons proposing a
reorganization of public higher education, but it was Senate
President Kevin Harrington who finally convened a special
commission on the reorganization of higher education.

This

special commission was chaired by Senator Walter Boverini and
consisted of five senators, ten representatives and ten
gubernatorial appointees.

This Special Commission, often referred

to as the Boverini Commission, accomplished little subsequent to
its formation in 1977 until the election of Edward J. King who had
defeated the incumbent Michael Dukakis as Governor of the
Commonwealth.

Governor King's ajpointees were sworn in on

October, 1979 and the Commission began its task in earnest.

It is

not unimportant that one of the platform issues espoused by Edward
King in his campaign for governor was the application of the
business values of efficiency and effectiveness in state
government.
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The Special Ccaranission organized its work into two subcrarnndttees to concentrate on separate issues.

One subcommittee

considered the overall governance of public higher education in
the Commonwealth, vrtiile the other subcommittee focused on the
reorganization of public higher education in the Boston area.
The Commission appeared to favor the establishment of a
strong central governing board and to reorganize public higher
education in the city of Boston but could not achieve a consensus.
The activity of the Boverini Commission remained stalemated,
perhaps in part because of Representative James Collins of
Amherst.

Representative Collins "_who chaired the House

Education Committee, remained vehemently opposed to the idea of a
central board.
UMass Amherst”

He saw it as a major threat to the auton<xny of
[Hogarty, p. 15].

Similarly, no consensus could be

achieved on the structure of public higher education in the city
of Boston ^hich included in addition to the University of
Massachusetts at Boston and Boston State College, Bunker Hill and
RorfDury Community Colleges and the Massachusetts College of Art.
The story may be apocryphal, but it is rumored that the three
leaders of Irish descent in the Commonwealth, Governor Edward
King, Sp)eaker of the House Thcxnas McGee, and the newly elected
Senate President William Bulger, agreed on a plane to Ireland
(pserhaps Amsterdam) that the reorganization of higher education
would be accomplished in an outside section of the budget for
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fiscal year 1981.

In April of 1980, Representative John Finnegan,

Chair of the House Committee on Ways and ^teans, released House
Bill 6200, the House budget for fiscal year 1981.

The outside

section of this budget proposed the creation of a fifteen member
Board of Regents to replace the segmental boards.
Hiis outside section permitted the boards of trustees of the
three state universities to remain intact, leaving the proposed
Board of Regents to administer the state and community college
systems,

lliere was a general public reaction against using the

budget process to accomplish a reorganization of public higher
education, though this alarm never reached sufficient proportions
to halt this particular legislation in the House of
Representatives.

The Massachusetts Teachers Association, a union

representing most faculty members in the Caonmonwealth system of
public higher education, was a major opponent of this approach to
reorganization and attacked the plan.
One result of House Bill 6200 was to stimulate a consensus on
the Boverini Coiranission.

The focus of Ccxnmission activity, just

as with the Finnegan legislation, was the reorganization of the
system of governance of public higher education.

James Collins

conceived a plan in May of 1980 that would create a twenty-one
member board of governors with the power to prepare a budget by
segment and institution, and vdiich could terminate programs or
degrees, and transfer an institution from one segment of public
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higher education to another by a two-thirds vote of the Board of
Governors.

A minority report by two members of the special

commission. Dr. George Hazzard and John F. Collins, a former
president of Worcester Polytechnic Institute and a former mayor of
Boston, respectively, was proposed.

George Hazzard and John

Collins called for the dissolution of the segmental and university
boards of trustees and the creation of a fifteen member Board of
Regents with the power to approve and terminate programs and
institutions, and with e3q>anded budgetary responsibilities.
The Senate budget bill did not include the outside language
proposed by Representative Finnegan.

The matter then became the

subject of a conference committee made necessary to resolve the
differences between the House and the Senate appropriation bills.
The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Ways and Ifeans, Chester
Atkins, had been an opponent of the reorganization of public
higher education, particularly though an outside section of the
budget.

However, on June 5, 1980 Senator Atkins had a change of

heart and both he and Representative Finnegan supported the
minority proposal of George Hazzard and John Collins.
The amendment of Chapter 15A of the Massachusetts General
Laws was accepted by the Conference Committee and included the
major recommendations of the Hazzard-Collins plan.

It created a

fifteen member Board of Regents with program and budgetary
responsibilities, and, with a two-thirds vote of the full
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membership of the Board, the power to consolidate, discontinue, or
transfer divisions, schools, stations, colleges, branches or
institutions as it deemed advisable.
The attachment of the bill to reorganize public higher
education in the Commonwealth to a budget bill emerging from a
conference coiranittee had a significant practical legislative
advantage for its proponents.
the bill could not be amended.

During debate in the two chambers,
Individuals would have to oppose

the budget in total in order to stop the legislation to reorganize
public higher education.

The Senate and House passed the budget

on June 10, 1980 and it was signed into law the same day by
Governor King.
The Higher Education Reorganization Act of 1980, the
attachment to the appropriation bill, abolished the segn^ntal
boards of trustees at the community and state colleges as well as
the position of the Secretary of Education and the Board of Higher
Education.

Each institution was provided with a local board of

trustees and, along with the university boards of trustees, were
placed under the overall authority of the Board of Regents vdiich
had both coordinating and governing functions.

The legislation

provided that reorganization would take effect in March of 1981.
In the debate and discussion of the overall governance of
public higher education in the Ctarnmonwealth, the issue of public
higher education in the city of Boston was tenporarily deferred.
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However, the delegation of the authority to the Board of Regents
to terminate colleges and institutions did not go unnoticed.
Governor King began to make his appointments to the newly
formed Board of Regents of Higher Education shortly after the
enactment of the legislation.

The Governor's appointments to the

new Board of Regents were primarily individuals from the business
world.

The Board Chairman of the Massachusetts Mutual Life

Insurance Company, James R. Martin, was appointed as the Regent's
first Chair.

The newly formed Board of Regents began intermittent

meetings during late 1980 prior to the assumption of its statutory
responsibilities in March of 1981.

In addition to the formidable

task of selecting of new Chancellor of the Board of Regents, a
major issue before the Board was the publicly unresolved issue of
public higher education in the city of Boston.
The Governor completed appointments to the newly formed Board
of Regents by late 1980.

The first substantive policy issue to be

taken up by the Board of Regents was the organization of public
higher education in the Boston area.

The Regents created a task

force for the purpose, chaired by George Hazzard, now a member of
the Board of Regents.

The task force conpleted its work just as

the Regents assumed its statutory responsibility in March of 1981,
calling for the discontined governance of Boston State College.
The Board of Regents appointed John Duff, President of the
tkiiversity of Lowell, as its first Chancellor in March of 1981.
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Chancellor Duff was a coitpromise appointment when the Board of
Regents could not select from three prominent contenders, David
Bartley (former Speaker of the House and sitting President of
Holyoke Community College), Kermit Morrissey (a prominent state
official and former President of Boston State College), and
Franklin Patterson (founding President of Hampshire College and
interim President of the University of Massachusetts).

The

original task force plan presented at a public hearing of April
10, 1981 was soundly attacked by Boston State College faculty
representatives, particularly John Moon, a union leader;
After examining the procedural irregularities
and the conceptual weakness of the report, I
concentrated my attack on its governing assumption:
"This report is most fundamentally flawed by its
underlying, mechanistic view.
The reigning image
is the comparison of higher education to a
reorganized factory.
Faculty, students, staff
were treated as movable parts which are to
directed and re-directed according to some
anonymous, invisible will." [1983, p. 14]
Chancellor Duff reviewed the task force plan and recommended
instead a new process for the consolidation of Boston State
College and the University of Massachusetts at Boston.

He offered

a plan similar to the implementation process used in the creation
of the Ikiiversity of Lowell.

Dr. Duff recommended establishing an

Implementation Board composed of Trustees from both Boston State
College and Ubfoss Boston as well as principal others.

There was

opposition to this plan from the University of Massachusetts Board
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Chair, Robert Quinn, because of concern over the coitposition of
the Implementation Board, v^ch apparently would mitigate the
influence of the University.

Boston State faculty opposed the

plan because it did not include a clear mandate to merge as equal
institutions.

The plan as presented by John Duff was the subject

of debate through June and July of 1982.
While the Board of Regents and its Chancellor were
considering a reasonable combination over a three-year period, the
legislature acted in a way v^ch precluded a lengthy process
leading to merger.

The voters of the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts had enacted a revenue restraining referendum.
Proposition 2 1/2, vrtiich capped local taxing authority.

In the

face of this drastic limitation on local revenue-raising capacity,
the Committees on Ways and Means in the House and Senate proposed
a substantial increase in funds for local aid for fiscal 1982.

In

the debate over the level of local aid the suggestion was made
that the Commonwealth could not also afford quality public higher
education as existed in other states.
The Senate appropriation bill for fiscal 1982 was, for public
higher education, compiled differently than in prior years.

It

grouped community colleges and universities into clusters and
provided for a specific amount of money for the operation of the
clustered entity.

While this Senate plan originally covered all

colleges and unversities in the Commonwealth, political pressure
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on Senators from local constituencies finally narrowed the concept
of clustering of public higher education frcan the entire
Commonwealth to the Boston area.

One cluster was the combination

of Framin^am State College and Mass Bay Community College in
Boston's western suburbs.

Another cluster occurred in the city of

Boston with the combination of the University of Massachusetts at
Boston, Boston State College, Roxbury and Bunker Hill Community
Colleges and the Mass College of Art.
cluster was notably short.

The funding for the Boston

In the face of a cumulative

underfunding of roughly six million dollars, a plan was set in
motion to accelerate the process of merger from three years to
less than one month.

In Augiist Chancellor Duff and the Board of

Regents decided to fully fund Roxbury and Bunker Hill Community
Colleges, the Ikiiversity of Massachusetts at Boston and the Mass
College of Art, and to discontinue Boston State College
immediately.

The Board of Regents approved this plan on

August 21, 1981.
Ihe plan accepted by the Board of Regents on August 21, 1981
included the following provisions;
1.

Those Boston State College faculty with an appropriate
terminal degree will be offered an appointment at UM^s
Boston at the same rank, salary and tenure status held
Boston State College.

The remaining faculty will be

terminated effective August 29, 1981.
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2.

Those Boston State College faculty terminated will
receive thirty days notice and all contractual
severance rights.

3.

Two hundred and seventy-five part-time faculty at
UMass Boston and Boston State will be terminated
immediately.

The faculty union took the matter to Suffolk Superior Court
and obtained a retraining order blocking the termination of any
faculty members at Boston State College.

On August 31, the Board

of Regents agreed to operate Boston State College for the fall,
1981 semester.
The faculty union contract in existence at Boston State
College called for the lay-off of faculty and other unit members
v^ien a state of financial exigency exists.

On September 8, 1981

the Board of Regents declared that such a situation existed and
the impact of the six million dollar budget underfimding was fully
placed on Boston State College.

The Board of Regents met on

October 30, 1981 to implement a plan for the final disposition of
faculty and staff at Boston State College.

At the n^eting a

motion was proposed to terminate most of the employees at Boston
State College.

"In a crowd-packed room, the Regents voted to

suspend the motion.

The Regents were assured, by the legislative

leadership in the last twenty tour hours before the meeting, that
a deficiency budget would be filed"
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[Jfoon, 1983, p. 19].

Chancellor John Duff was asked to provide the educational
reasons behind the merger to the legislature's Joint Committee on
Education on November 23, 1981.
was program duplication.

A primary focus of his attention

He noted that 80% of all majors at

Boston State were duplicated at UMass Boston.

He also cited some

telling statistics indicating student/faculty ratios at Boston
State:
At Boston State College, the History faculty numbers
30 full-time professors; there are 73 majors in History.
Ihe English faculty numbers 42 fiill-time faculty;
there are 106 majors in English. The Physics faculty
numbers 7 full-time professors; there are 8 majors in
Physics. The Chemistry faculty numbers 8 full-time
professors; there are 14 majors in Chemistry. The
Philosc^y faculty numbers 9 fiill-tiroe professors;
there are 12 majors in Philosphy.
On the other hand, the Management program has 1002 majors
and 4 full-time faculty. Now, if that is not an unwise
use of faculty resources, then I do not know vrtiat is an
unwise use of faculty resources. [Duff, November 23, 1981]
It was not until January 5, 1982 that the legislature passed
and the Governor signed Chapter 808 of the Acts of 1981, a
si^plemental budget appropriation.

Chapter 808 directed the Board

of Regents to discontinue Boston State College as of January 24,
1982.

The bill also provided an authorization for the Regents to

continue displaced Boston State faculty on the Regents payroll
until they could find other employment in the system of public
hi^er education or until June 30, 1982, v^iichever came first.
The June 30th deadline was later extended until.August 31, 1982.
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The bill also provided that tenured faculty members would continue
to retain the privilege and that, where appropriate, six years of
seniority would apply to Boston State faculty members enployed in
the public higher education system other than another state
college.
The long process of merger that started with the
consideration of reorganization of all of public higher education
in the Commonwealth came to a conclusion on January 24, 1982.

The

impact of the merger was felt for years after the actual fact of
the combination.

The University of Massachusetts at Boston

appeared to pick and choose from among Boston State faculty it
deemed worthy of teaching at the university.

Other state college

faculty were reluctant to accept into their faculty ranks Boston
State College personnel senior to them.

There was also concern

that since these individuals could be placed in low enrollment
departments at other state colleges, they would in fact displace
resident faculty members in time.

Many former Boston State

College faculty members found employment at the University of
Lowell and in the community college system.
Most of the individuals frcan Boston State College were placed
by September 30, 1982.

More than twenty faculty members chose

early retirement rather than alternative placement.

Yet the legal

problems continued throu^ 1989 as a result of personnel placement
in the merger of the two institutions.
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The above represents a chronological outline of the events
leading up to the merger of Boston State College and UMass Boston.
Yet such a chronological perspective merely sets the framework for
an understanding of the issues which precipitated merger and which
influenced the process by \diich the merger was carried out.
thing is certain regarding this merger:
policy prevailed.

One

The power of public

Whether the agreement of the State’s leaders

occurred on a plane ride to Ireland or to Amsterdam or in the
halls of the State House, the obvious fact remains that there was
an agreement, and this agreement resulted in the reorganization of
public higher education and in the merger of Boston State College
and UMass/Boston.
A common question was posed to prominent individuals,
participants in the public arena at the time of the merger:

"Why

was the first policy act of a newly created Board of Regents,
consisting of fifteen individuals frcan disparate backgrounds, and
with no governance esqjerience in public higher education, the
merger of a 130-year old state college into a 17-year old
university?"
Former Governor Foster Furcolo, an original member of the
Board of Regents, indicated that the question of merger did not
appear to be whether it should be done, but how it would be
accomplished.

Governor Furcolo observed that his major concern in

the matter was that the combination be a merger of equals, and not
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a situation in vdiich UMass would dictate the terms of the merger.
Regent Furcolo was one of two Regents to vote against the August
merger plan to dissolve Boston State for the fall semester of 1981
[personal communication, January 25, 1989].
Robert Quinn, former Speaker of the House of Representatives
and Chairman of the UMass Boston Board of Trustees, felt the
merger appeared inevitable especially after the reorganization of
public higher education in the Ccanmonwealth.

Speaker Quinn wanted

the University to continue its development and advancement as a
prominent public university in the city of Boston.

It was not a

decision of UMass Boston to merge the two institutions; however,
the Iftiiversity took the issue of merger seriously and attempted to
make those decisions that would strengthen the University over
time.

It appeared that those lobbying for Boston State College

were trying to obfuscate the educational issues involved which the
Ikiiversity considered primary.

The budget for fiscal 1982,

especially the cluster budget, forced the issue of it^rger
[personal communication, Febuary 7, 1989].
Representative (now Senator) Michael Creedon, Chairman of the
House Committee on Ways and Means in March of 1981, felt the
fiscal 1982 budget was the precipitating action which brought
about the merger of the two institutions.

The budget crisis was a

direct result of Proposition 2 1/2 and the State's effort to
provide a substantial increase in local aid to cities and towns.
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Representative Creedon suggested there existed a general
understanding that UMass Boston was the appropriate provider of
urban public baccalaureate education, primarily as a result of the
leadership of Robert Quinn.

He felt it was redundant to have both

Boston State College and UMass Boston.

Boston State College had a

number of serious problems including a bad location, poor
facilities and hodgepodge of faculty members.

The Board of

Regents did not make the merger its first act, the real decision
was made by the legislature and underfunding the Boston cluster
was the vehicle to accomplish it [personal communication,
January 31, 1989].
Roger Schiness, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs at the
Board of Regents at the time, suggested that it was the
legislative intent to merge the two institutions.

He noted that

it was a public policy decision to discontinue Boston State
College, and the job of accomplishing of it was left to the Board
of Regents.

He felt by August of 1981 the Board of Regents and

John Duff were faced with the reality of discontinuance, and no
longer could sustain the possibility of a merger of equals.

The

issue then became vAiat to do with faculty members at Boston State
College and how to least disrupt students [personal communication,
January 26, 1989].
Kevin Harrington, former Senate President, felt the academic
decline of Boston State College in the late 60's and 70's and its
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corntnunity college-like open enrollment policy made the long term
existence of Boston State College untenable.

The institution’s

reputation declined to such an extent that it was not a conpetent
conpetitor in the race to offer public baccalaureate education in
the city of Boston.

He suggests that Governor King apparently

reached an agreement with House Speaker McGee and Senate President
Bulger and that this agreement ultimately resulted in the
legislation that brought about merger [personal communication,
February 3, 1989].
Franklin Patterson, at the time of merger a professor at the
University of Massachusetts at Boston, but formerly interim
President of the University of Massachusetts, felt the merger
arose as a result of an agreement among the leadership in the
legislature of House Speaker McGee and Senate President Bulger and
the willingness of the Governor to go along with both
reorganization and the merger of the two institutions.

Dr.

Patterson opined that although the Ikiiversity of Massachusetts at
Boston had no interest in the merger, once it was perceived as
inevitable, the strategy then became how to help UMass Boston come
out of the situation stronger and to avoid those compromises that
would diminish its stature.

Since this merger would in fact be

acccsiplished, there was a sense of a primary responsibility to see
that the University improve itself [personal ccmtmunication,
March 15, 1988].
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John Weston, former Boston State College professor and now a
staff member at the Board of Regents, considered the unresolved
issues fr<Mn the Boverini Commission deliberations in the late
1970's as the primary cause of the merger.

At those hearings

every reeison proposed in favor of the merger was always countered
with an equally valid reason for opposing the merger.

He said

that although the University of M^sachiisetts at Boston did not
appear to want a merger, once it appeared that such an action
would be inevitable, the University wanted to be on top.

The

public policy issue of the role of public higher education in
Boston was never adequately addressed either by the Boverini
Commission or subsequently by the Board of Regents.

UMass Boston

was apparently created to serve the inner city and the
disadvantaged, but this, too, was the same mission as Boston State
College.

UMass chose an elitist "Harvard-on-the-Harbor” approach.

John Weston also points to the role of Kermit Morrissey in
the merger process.

Kermit Morrissey was appointed President of

Boston State College in the early 1970's, yet had lost the
confidence of its faculty by 1980.

Kermit Morrissey, v^ile

President of Boston State College, supported the elimination of
BSC and its merger with UMass Boston.

Although he had political

clout and a long standing relationship with the political
leadership in the Commonwealth, his recommendation of merger was
not supported by Boston State faculty [personal communication,
February 22, 1988].
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Dr. Houston Elam, then Dean of Business at UMass Boston,
suggests that the real reason for the merger is related to the
development of pxjblic policy.

Governor King had canpaigned on a

platform of efficiency in government and reducing duplication in
higher education.

'This campaign promise required some validation

and he was able to secure agreement with the legislative
leadership to acconplish reorganization and merger.

He could

accomplish both objectives through the creation of the Board of
Regents and by reducing the number of institutions in the State by
consolidating Boston State and UMass Boston.

Dr. Elam felt that

UMass Boston had very little choice in how to approach the matter
of merger.

There was an excess capacity in public baccalaureate

education in Boston and in self-defense the Iftiiversity had to take
those steps vdiich would support and oichance the University's
standing.

If there had been a merger of all faculty, it would not

have resulted in a faculty with the status expected at a
university.

Had there been a combination of equals it would not

have been a university but a "collaversity", something between a
state college and a university.

In the face of a situation v^ch

it did not create, the University chose to do that vdiich woiild
most enhance its standing [personal cararainication, June 5, 1989].
John Moon has written extensively on the issues of this
merger.

He was Professor of History at Boston State College,

President of its Faculty Association, and led the fight to halt
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the reorganization that resulted in the merger of Boston State
College and UMass Boston.
The question that confronted the Regents vdien
they assumed authority on March 1, 1981, was
the question of public higher education in the
Metropolitan Boston area. For a number of
years a conviction had grown among the
legislative leadership, a conviction shared
hy the Governor, that there were too many
institutions of public higher education in
the Boston area. Long before March 1, 1981,
this conviction had hardened to dogma.
[1982, p. 57]
John Moon writes with a highly charged and emotional pen of a
prevailing analysis of the merger:
Many Boston State College students and faculty
are convinced that the destruction of BSC was
the culmination of a sinister, well coordinated
conspiracy between leaders in state government,
the high technology lobby, the private colleges
and universities and the University of
Massachusetts. A few men of power had decided
that Boston State College must be eliminated.
[1982, p. 60]

Moon suggests that rather than a Manichean duel, one must
understand that educational policy makers had several alternatives
open to them, including maintenance of the status quo,
discontinuance of UMass Boston and merging it into Boston State
College, or consolidate UMass and Boston State College as equals,
in addition to the actual historical result of January, 1982.

He

suggests the status quo was never feasible because of the
prevailing political assunption that son^thing had to be done in
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the face of Proposition 2 1/2.

He notes that the prospect of the

discontinuance of UMass Boston was never seriously considered
because the University was perceived as the stronger acadendc
institution.

Finally, the merger of the two institutions as

equals was not appealing either to the legislature or the
Governor.

"It was too slow, too deliberate, too dependent upon

elaborate committee reports, and less consultation and sensitive
compromise" [1982, p. 62].
UMB administration took a position which
was clear and ruthlessly consistent. If
the merger took place, it should be dictated
and governed by the University. UMB would
take whatever programs and personnel it
wanted and needed. Unfortimately for the
Boston State faculty, the overwheming
majority of UMB faculty supported the
administration policy of academic
annexation. [1982, p. 63]
Moon concludes with notable emotion and resignation;
So the issue was resolved on a Darwinian
battlefield. In the absence of leadership
from those whose responsibility it is to
act impartially vdien dealing with competing
interests, the University of Massachusetts
at Boston reorganized higher education in
the metropolitan area. Reorganization
took place as it did because this course
of action was seen as the easiest solution
to an accepted problem. [1982, p. 64]

John Duff, Chancellor of the Board of Regents at the time
charged with implementing the merger, suggests the merger came
about through legislative pressure.
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Such a merger had long been

talked about and appeared inevitable.

There was common knowledge

of declining enrollment at Boston State College and of the
resultant effort to admit on an open basis.

This approach to

enrollment was especially notable in contrast to UMass Boston.
Boston State College was perceived as superfluous in a city with a
university offering pijblic baccalaureate education.

It also had

the reputation of being a dunping ground for problem enployees and
as a place vrtiere friends of politicians could get jobs.

Finally,

Boston State College had few defenders of stature except for its
faculty and a few of the faculty friends in the legislature.

In

contrast, the newly elected Governor was strong and supported
consolidation.
The cluster budget for fiscal 1982 was the vehicle by which
the Boston State College closure was forced.

Chancellor Duff

makes the point that in spite of the personal upheaveal created by
the process of merger, the creation of a single baccalaureate
degree granting university in the city of Boston has ultimately
proven to be a successful venture [personal communication, June 5,
1989].
Summary
There is a clear pattern that emerges from a review of the
chronological sequence of events and the comments of the principal
participants in the merger that combined Boston State College and
UMass Boston.

The combination was an overt act of public policy
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even though the process it took may have hidden the intentions
that lay behind that policy development.

It may well have been

the canpaign promises of Governor Edward King and the agreement of
Speaker McGee and President Bulger vdiich brought about this
policy.

While this instance of public policy was not drawn in the

articulate fashion of Foster Furcolo in this desire to combine the
textile schools and create Southeastern Massachusetts University,
it can still be said that this policy was based on a reasonable
assessment of the situation of pijblic baccalaureate education in
the city of Bostcxi.
The reorganization commission appeared to be an appropriate
political approach to achieve this policy but it failed to achieve
a consensus.

Boston State College faculty members had numerous

personal contacts with individual legislators and the effect of
this negative vote helped the cause of delaying an agreement on
the issue of merger.

This negative vote was ironically

complemented by the actions of the University of Massachusetts and
the Amherst representative, James Collins, \dio opposed the
creation of a strong coitral authority over all of public higher
education and, hence, worked against a consensus in the committee.
Ihis seems to be an instance of a successful public policy,
viewed frcmi the detached perspective of the analyst eight years
after the fact.

This judgn^nt can be made with a simple

observation that the University of Massachusetts does indeed
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provide a quality baccalaureate education in the city of Boston,
There is no redundancy in the public mission in the city v^ch has
a university and community colleges, save, however, the status of
the Mass College of Art.

The latter represents a specialized

baccalaureate education in the city which is tenable as a separate
institution only as long as that specialized education can remain
distinct frcan that of the xmiversity.
If one can say that the merger policy was successful because
subsequent events have proven its merit, one must also be prepared
to say that its major failure is the manner of its implementation.
The poor treatment of the individuals involved and the failure to
co-opt the two institutional participants in the process resulted
in a merger that deeply effected the lives of many people.
Many faculty members at Boston State College sinply could not
believe that the institution would close.

Ihis view sustained

them in their effort to view the alternative to merger as the
status quo.

This belief worked in direct contravention of the

consensus of the political leadership in the Commonwealth vtfiich
was determined to close Boston State and n«rge it with the
University of Massachusetts at Boston.
Chancellor John Duff, handed the difficult situation of
implementing the merger, was successful in maintaining the
enployment status of virtually every Boston State College
employee.

But anger persists to this day over the compromises
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this process produced in the lives of the individuals involved,
primarily because of their sense of powerlessness to influence the
situation.

Many careers were fundamentally altered in the process

of merger.
There is an ironic perspective one can take on the placement
of Boston State College eitployees.

In the situation where the

University would pick and choose those it felt were appropriate
for its purposes, and where other state colleges were reluctant to
take individuals with many years of seniority, the placement
process almost had to be in some respect unsatisfactory to the
individuals involved.

It may have been better to sinply terminate

the employment of all individuals immediately upon the dissolution
of Boston State College.

Those individuals formerly employed at

Boston State College are now spread throughout the system and
carry their anger over their treatment with them to this day.
Yet, too, the lingering memory of the UMass Boston merger had a
definite and positive inpact on subsequent events in public higher
education in the Commonwealth, roost specifically on the merger of
Massasoit Comraunity College with the Blue Hills Technical
Institute in 1985.
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CHAPTER 4
MASSASOIT COMMUNTrY COLLE3GE, 1985
Introduction
•nie August 1, 1985 merger of Massasoit Community College with
the Blue Hills Technical Institute was finally acconplished with
the enactment of the fiscal 1986 budget act ^diich included the
legislative authorization for the merger.

This merger, just as

the three earlier public sector mergers before it, represented an
instance of public policy activity because of this legislative
connection.

Yet ^^le this merger was similar to the three

earlier combinations regarding legislative action, there was also
a difference in the process by which the legislation was created.
The mergers that brought about Southeastern Massachusetts
lAiiversity, the lAiiversity of Lowell, and the Itoiversity of
Massachusetts at Boston, were the result of initiatives by either
the aoecutive or the legislature or both.

Ihe legislation that

resulted in the creation of a new Massasoit Community College in
1985 was the culmination of actions initiated at the local level
and ^rtiich resulted in approval by the legislature and the
executive vdio held final responsibility.
It is this variation ^ich, in the instance of Massasoit
Caonraunity College, requires an adjustment in the primary focus of
analysis, to include not only the perspective from the system of
public higher education but the view from the institutional level

as well.

That is, there were certain local institutional and

environmental characteristics v^ch began the process that
culminated in the merger of the two institutions.

It was, then,

the responsibility of those institutions proposing a merger, and
consequently suggesting a change in public policy, to indicate
that this merger made sense not only institutionally but in terms
of the system of public higher education in the Commonwealth.
•nie immediate precipitating factor in the merger of M^sasoit
and Blue Hills was the enactment of the Proposition 2 1/2
referendum, just as it was in the UMass Boston situation.

In the

instance of UMass Boston this Proposition led to merger because of
the agreement of executive and legislative leadership to limit
state spending in order to provide additional funding for local
cities and towns.
Proposition 2 1/2 also had a notable impact on cities and
towns in the Commonwealth and ultimately brought the Blue Hills
Technical Institute to the point of merger.

Since the tax capping

referendum required a limitation on local expenditures, the seven
member town school district eliminated local tax support for the
post-secondary activities of the regional school district.

Since

the Technical Institute could not maintain an adequate level of
performance without this local subsidy. Proposition 2 1/2 was also
a precipitating factor in the Massasoit - Blue Hills merger even
though it came three yeaurs after the UMass Boston merger.
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•Hiere was very little contact between Massasoit Community
College and the Blue Hills Technical Institute in the twenty years
before the merger, in spite of some parallels in the development
of these two institutions.

While both institutions

awarded the

associates degree, the focus of each institution was distinct.
Massasoit Oamraunity College pursued a comprehensive mission to
provide transfer and career training for its graduates vrtiile the
Blue Hills Technical Institute sought a more narrow and
specicdized vocational training for its degree recipients.
Massasoit Communitv College
State supported regional community colleges in M^sachusetts
were created with the passage of Chapter 605 of the Acts of 1958,
the enabling legislation for the system of community colleges.

A

central governing body, the Board of Regional Community Colleges,
was established to oversee the system and to determine the need
for community colleges throu^out the various regions of the
Commonwealth.

Community college services were expected to be

within reach of 95% of the population.

Subsequent legislation

enacted in 1964 granted the Board of Regional Community Colleges
the same operational, autoncanous status as the four year segments
of public hi^er education, the universities and the state
colleges.
The Willis-Harrington Act of 1965 substantially reorganized
and restructured the educational system in Massachusetts,
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"nie

community colleges remained a distinct and autonomous segment
within a system of public higher education, governed by the
Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges

(MBRCC).

A

segmental board was also created for the eleven state colleges,
and separate boards of trustees were created for the universities.
As one element of a system of regional community colleges,
Massasoit Community College opened in 1966 to serve the area south
of Boston.

It was the eleventh college in a system that would

number fifteen institutions by 1973.

The College was housed in

several temporary facilities in various towns for six years before
moving to its newly constructed and permanent home in Brockton in
1972.

By 1978 the final construction of its ten building, one

hundred acre campus was completed.

The College was accredited by

the New England Association of Schools and Colleges in 1970.
Governance of public higher education in Massachiisetts again
changed with the passage of the outside section of the fiscal 1981
appropriation act.

The segmental governing boards, including the

Board of Regional Community Colleges, were replaced by an overall
coordinating body,

the Board of Regents of Higher Education.

At

the institutional level community colleges were delegated
substantial local control over operations, with said
responsibility assigned to the newly created institutional Board
of Trustees.

The Governor appoints ten of the eleven numbers of

the local board for a five year period, renewable for one
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consecutive term.

The eleventh tnastee is elected annually by the

student body.
When Massasoit opened in 1966, there were 358 students
enrolled.

The College esq^erienced continued growth in enrollment

so that by the academic year 1984-85 there were 6,213 headcount
students at the institution.

Students were enrolled in curricula

designed to meet the comprehensive college mission of providing
liberal arts transfer and terminal occupational degree programs.
The Liberal Arts degree programs were created primarily for
those students intending to transfer to four year colleges and
ijniversifies.

The courses in this program were structured to

parallel the first two years of a four year baccalaureate degree
program.

The occupational programs at the College were in non¬

capital equipment intensive programs such as secretarial,
accounting, and merchandising because of limitations of space,
facilities, equipment, and staff.

There was also an academic

reason to emphasize the less technical occupational programs.
This approach was also based on the assumption that the education
and training required for technical and specialized jobs would
change rapidly, and that as a result the College should attenpt to
I

provide students with a broad based (i.e., liberal arts) education
vdiich can be applied to changing skill demands.
In 1984, Massasoit awarded the Associate in Arts

(AA) or

Associate in Science (AS) degrees in fourteen programs and
Certificates in three one-year programs.
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Table 2
Massasoit Communitv Colleae Academic Proorams
Prooram

Credits

Transfer
Business Administration
Liberal Arts

60
60

Career
Busimess Administration
Data Processing
Electronic Engineering
Electro-Mechanical Engineering
Executive Secretarial
Solar Enegery Technology
Fire Science Technology
Law Enforcement
Dental Lab Technology
Human Services
Nurse Education
Respiratory Therapy

60
60
65
65
68
61
60
60
65
62
64
68

Certificate
Clerical Office Assistant
Drafting
Medical Transcriptionist

30
30
33

At the time the merger was being negotiated, M^sasoit was
considered a large, coirprehensive community college.

It was

governed hy a local Board of Trustees under the general oversight
of the Board of Regents of Higher Education.

Operational and

capital funds were derived primarily from appropriations by the
state legislature.

It was one of fifteen community colleges in a

system of public higher education v^ch also included ten state
colleges and three universities.
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Blue Hills Technical Institute
A major event in the developnent of career education in the
IMited States was the enactment of the Vocational Act of 1963
(P.L. 88-210) vdiich emphasized and provided funding for the
development of vocational education throughout the country.

At

the same time the existing Chapter 71 Section 16 of the General
Laws of Massachusetts provided for the establishment of regional
vocational school districts.

Representatives frcan the seven towns

of Avon, Braintree, Canton, Holbrook, Norwood, Randolph, and
Westwood, Massachusetts planned the creation of a public career
education center in the Bl\ie Hills region south of Boston.

On

December 17, 1963, all seven towns agreed to the creation of the
Blue Hills Regional Vocational School District.
Governance of the new entity was to be through a district
school committee, a public body with all powers and duties
conferred by law.

Members of the district committee were elected

by popular vote, one from each of the member towns on a rotating
basis for three year terms.

Programmatically, the school

committee was then authorized to establish and maintain vocational
education programs at the secondary, postsecondary, and adult
levels as provided in of Chapter 74 of the Massachusetts General
Laws.
Following agreement of the towns in 1963 to create the school
district and elect members of the regional committee, there was a
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period of planning and construction.

Two schools were developed

during the planning period of 1964-66, one a vocational technical
high school for grades nine to twelve and the other a post¬
secondary technical institute.

Both schools would operate in the

same building but would use different classrooms, labs, and
faculty.

In the fall of 1966 the regional high school and the

regional technical institute were opened in a new facility in
Canton, Massachusetts.

The Technical Institute offered one and

two year non-degree vocational technical programs at the post¬
secondary level.

There were 93 students enrolled in the tedinical

Institute's first class.
The Willis-Harrington Act of 1965, referenced earlier,
separated state-wide educational responsibilities from the single
Board of Education to a segmental system.

Ihe Act created a Board

of Education with primary and secondary education oversight
responsibility and separate boards accountable for the various
institutions of public higher education.

The legislation also

created a Board of Higher Education \diich had general oversight
and coordinating responsibilities for higher education in the
Commonwealth including the authority to approve institutional
requests to award postsecondary degrees.
The regional school district was answerable to the Board of
Education for operational purposes but had to satisfy requirements
established by the Board of Higher Education for its post-
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secondary programs.

The Regional School Committee and its

administrators sought formal degree granting authority for its
postsecondary programs shortly after opening the Institute.

This

authority was permitted under the provisions of Chapter 74,
Section 37A, MGL, which required approval by both the Board of
Education and the Board of Higher Education.
The Technical Institute was granted the authority to confer
the Associate in Applied Science <AAS) degree in April, 1970.
Starting with the graduating class of 1970,

those candidates v^o

met the requirements of the program in which they were enrolled
were awarded either a certificate of program completion or an AAS
degree.

Permanent degree granting authority was granted to the

Technical Institute by the Board of Higher Education on
December 23, 1971, subject to periodic review to insure
instructional quality.

The school district, through its Technical

Institute, became the only regional school district in the
Commonwealth with authority to confer the AAS degree.
The Technical Institute becane affliated with the New England
Association of School and Colleges
a candidate for accreditation.

(NEASC) on November 15, 1972 as

Application for accreditation and

full membership in the NEASC was made and a self study conducted
during the academic year 1977-78.

Hie Institute was accredited as

a degree granting institution in 1978 by the NEASC through its
commission on vocational,

technical, and career institutions and
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received continuing accreditation in 1983.

As enrollment grew,

additional space was needed for both secondary and postsecondary
programs.

The Technical Institute moved into a newly constructed

facility, separate from the high school but adjacent to it, in
1976.
From its founding in 1966 through 1978, operational funding
for the Institute was tram categorical state vocational public
school aid with the balance from local taxes.
formula changed in 1978.

The state aid

In 1979, the Technical Institute was

authorized to collect tuition from students.

In 1980, Proposition

2 1/2 limited town revenue raising capacity, and this in turn
resulted in the elimination the local tax-based support by the
school committee for the operation of the Institute.

Changes in

state aid and the loss of local support n^ant that student tuition
would be increasingly required to carry the major burden of
institutional support.
Over the years 1966-84 the Institute enrollment grew to about
500 students.

By 1984 it awarded the Associate in implied Science

Degree in nine program areas and certificates in two other areas.
The certificate and degree programs and credit requirements follow
in Table 3.
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Table 3
Blue Hills Technical Institute Academic Programs
Program

Credits (Minimum)

Medical Assistant
Dental Assistant
Architectural Technology
Electro-Mechanical Technology
Electronics
Civil/Structural Technology
Diesel Technology
HVAC Technology
Advertising and Art Design
Medical Laboratory Technician
Data Processing/Conputer Programming

38 (certificate)
36 (certificate)
78
70
70
79

66
73
73
73
74

Hie Institute followed the clear mandate of its charter and
the school district hy ertphasizing its vocational/technical,
career occupational role.

This mission was based on large part

premise that further vocational training beyond high school opens
greater occupational ojportunities than does a high school
diploma.
Hie Institutions Compared
Leyland Medsker [1960] has noted that public two year
institutions have developed in different ways throughout the
lAiited States, though v^ere they have formed he finds the origins
rather easy to categorize.
The principal types that have developed
are (1) the locally controlled and supported
junior or community college with or without
state aid, (2) the junior college or technical
institute fully controlled and supported by
the state, and (3) the two-year extension
center of a four-year college or university.
[p. 13]
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Massasoit's origins are obvious.

It is one of fifteen state

supported regional TOinmunity colleges.

However, not all of the

state suj^rted community colleges were originally established by
the Board of Regional Community Colleges.

Holyoke Community

College was founded in 1946 as a municipal junior college.
came under the jurisdiction of the state system in 1964.

It
In

addition, by a 1967 act of the legislatiore, the responsibility for
the Springfield Technical Institute was transferred from the city
of Springfield to the Massaschiisetts Board of Regional Community
Colleges (MBRCC).

The Institute was renamed Springfield Technical

Community College and was to retain a primary emphasis on post¬
secondary technical education.

The process by vdiich Springfield

was brought into the state community college system was primarily
political; the Regional Community College Master Plan did not call
for two separate colleges in Itolyoke and Springfield.
The MBRCC Master Plan did include a priority for a college in
the near South Shore area of Boston, and specifically intended to
take over a city-supported college in Quincy, Massachusetts [Deyo,
1965].

It was in Quincy vdiere, after Holyoke became state-

supported, the only remaining municipal junior college in the
Commonwealth existed.

This attempt to create a state supported

community college in the city failed when Quincy chose to retain
control of its municipal junior college.
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By defaiilt, Massasoit

thus becaine the cananunity college responsible for a large region
to the near south and southwest of Boston as Quincy Junior College
maintained its local focus.
The Technical Institute, in contrast to Massasoit, was a
locally controlled institution with state suK^ort.

Much of this

state siTOort originated with the federal government through the
Vocational Education Act and was distributed under the authority
of state statutes.

Massasoit was one college in the system of

public hi^er education, while the Technical Institute's purpose
was tied to secondary education.

Indeed, the law (Ch. 74, S.37A)

v^ch authorized the creation of technical institutes,
specifically based the justification for such institutions on the
necessity of additional training beyond the secondary level:
If a school committee or board of trustees
of any industrial, technical, argriculturad.,
or vocational school subject to this chapter
determines that sufficient need exists in
such school for a coinrse or courses beyond
secondary school level and designed to prepare
students for greater opportunity for enployment
in industrial, argricultural, and technical
occupations, it may subanit in writing its plans
for such course or coiorses to the Board of
Higher Education.
It is the same law which also provides for the awarding of
the AAS degree.

The extent to vdiich a local school district

offers post secondary courses or programs is a decision of the
local board or committee.
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While the two institutions differed in regard to the locus of
public control, they were also distinct in their educational
programs.

Massasoit specifically, and the regional community

college system generally, chose from the outset to emphasize its
coitprehensive educational program nature.

The two year liberal

arts program was designed for transfer to four year colleges and
universities.

However, even the occupational programs for those

interested in immediate job training had a strong general
education component, seeking a balance between the traditional
liberal aurts studies and specialized technical courses.

There was

a deliberate attempt to avoid programs at the trade level, the
training of skilled workers in specialized vocational programs.
The Technical Institute, on the other hand, emphasized those
programs where students would learn manual and technical skills.
This programmatic entasis was the same as the regional high
school where 75% of the courses in a program of study were to be
directly or indirectly related to learning skills of a particular
vocation.

The Institute's avowed purpose was to develop

technically competent individuals for immediate entry into the job
market.

Hie reason the Institute pursued post secondary technical

programs was the purposeful avoidance of such programs by public
community colleges, a policy vrtiich left a void in the range of two
year programs available to citizens of the Commonwealth.

Indeed,

the academic departmental structure of the Institute as depicted
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in its 1978 self study reflected this primary focus on skills
training.

Each degree or certificate program was organized in a

separate department, but the traditional academic disciplines of
English, History and the like were organized in a single "academic
department".

The NEASC recommended, and the Institute ultimately

adopted, a separate department status for the academic
disciplines, but the orginal organizational structxire is telling.
Both Institutions opened in 1966, were publicly controlled,
and offered programs leading to the associate degree.

The

enrollment at Massasoit with its comprehensive educational program
was notably larger than the Technical Institute with its
specialized vocational programs.

During the years 1966 - 1984

there was no competition or cooperation between the two
institutions and, indeed, little contact.
Two Characteristics of the Merger Process
In the introduction of this chapter it was noted that the
Massasoit/Blue Hills merger differed frcan the earlier mergers in
the Commonwealth because it was characterized by public policy
from the bottom up rather than top down.

This meant that the

participants in the merger had to accomplish the substantive
aspects of the merger process;

The development of a merger

consistent with public policy as well as an agreement of the
institutions involved.
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In order to influence public policy the College and the
Institute had to develop a rationale which e3q)lained the purposes
of the merger, the relationship of the merger to the mission of
the caramunity colleges, and finally the impact of this merger in
the conduct of public higher education in the Commonwealth.
Simultaneously, the institutions had to resolve those academic,
personnel and financial issues that had to be settled in order to
accomplish the merger.

While these two processes occurred at the

same time, it is possible to separate them for descriptive
purposes.
Public Issues
Hie first contact between the Blue Hills Technical Institute
and Massasoit Community College took place in January of 1984.

By

May of 1984 it was apparent that there was sufficient interest by
both parties to proceed and to develop a rationale which would
support the concept of the proposed merger.

To that end,

Massasoit Community College produced a docunent entitled "On
Behalf of a Proposed Merger Between Massasoit Community College
and Blue Hills Regional Technical Institute" which served as the
basis of all subsequent public announcements regarding the merger.
The paper was a straightforward rationale for the merger.
The background statement provided that the negative inpact of
Proposition 2 1/2 placed the Technical Institute in an imtenable
long term situation regarding operational funding.
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Four separate groups were identified that stood to benefit
from the merger.

The first was the Blue Hills Technical Institute

and the seven towns in the school district which would provide for
a continuation of postsecondary level technical education at a low
cost and without a financial burden for the school district.

The

second, Massasoit Community College, would greatly benefit from an
extended ability to meet the educational needs of South Shore
residents.

Ihe third group, the governing boards of education and

regents, would find a workable solution to a nettlesome
jurisdictional problem but which did not duplicate existing
postsecondary programs.

Finally, the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts, which maintained authority over all these groups,
had a strong concern for the State's economic development and
would provide a continuity for an educational program which
assisted in that growth [Massasoit Community College, May, 1984,
p. 2].
The position paper was supplemented by letters to area
senators and representatives fr<»n Gerard F. Burke, Massasoit's
President, apprising them of the n^rger and soliciting their
support.

These coiranunications suggested six advantages to the

proposed merger:
1)

To insure the survival of the Technical Institute,
thus continuing services to the area students and, in
addition, meeting the institute's financial commitment to
bond holders;
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2)

3)
4)

5)

6)

To develop a strengthened comprehensive community based
college to meet the needs of the growing high tech
industry and South Shore areas;
To provide Massasoit with additional classroom space in a
populous part of its service area;
To eliminate the duplication of post-secondary
educational programs in the area and to place all public
programs under the govemace of the State’s Board of
Regents of Higher Education;
To e:q>and programs and services currently available to
Blue Hills area students beyond those presently available
at the Technical Institute;
To enhance Massasoit's curricnilum in the technological
field. [Massasoit Community College, June 6, 1984]

The above represents the public rationale behind the proposed
merger.

Yet, certain formal actions remained to be accomplished,

including formal approval by the Blue Hills Regional School
Committee and the Massasoit Community College Board of Trustees,
approval by the Board of Regents of Higher Education, approval by
both the House of Representatives and the State Senate, and
agreen«nt by the Governor.

While the process of securing the

approval of these authoritative bodies was necessarily intertwined
with the resolution of various inter-institutional issues, it is
important to note that the approval of all these groups was
essential in the long term for the success of the merger.

Clearly

the ultimate authority rested with the legislature and the
Governor, but securing their approval was certainly easier by
having affirmative votes from those groups with more immediate
institutional and programmatic responsibilities.
The Massasoit Community College Board of Trustees had a
relatively easy decision to make.
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The prospect of merger would

carry little threat of financial adversity to the institution, if
funding for the merger would be forthcoming from the state.

The

Board made the fundamental decision that the merger would proceed
only with additional state appropriated funds to support College
operations.

The other considerations then had to do with the

impact of a permanent branch campus on the routine operation of
the college since the Board was convinced that the programmatic
combination was a good one.
The College administration was able to convince the Board
that the complimentary academic programs of the institutions and
the greater service to the constituent cirea would far outweigh any
of the potential organizational disfunctions that might accompany
the merger.

The administration provided the Board with a plan for

operating the branch campus in Canton.

Of course, a great deal of

informal discussion and debate took place behind the scenes, but
this review of the issues never posed a threat to the possibility
of merger from the M^sasoit perspective.

Ihe Board's detached

approach effectively delegated the authority for detailed
negotiations to be handled by the College and other state
administrators [James Slattery, personal comanunication, August 28,
1989].
If an assurance of financial stability was necessary to
secure the favorable opinion of the Massasoit Community College
Board of Trustees, it is significant that an irreconcilable
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financial problem lay at the base of the decision of the Blue
Hills Regional School Committee.

A brief review of the funding

history of the Technical Institute is necessary to reach an
understanding of the financial situation that confronted the
Regional School Committee.
William Dv^er was the founding Superintendent Director of the
Blue Hills Regional School and was the major force behind the
creation of the associate degree granting programs of the
district.

Mr. Dwyer's reputation was of a particularly skillful

lobbying ability and of contacts with inflxiential legislators.
Bill Dwyer was successful in convincing the Regional School
Committee in the mid '60's and early '70's that there was a void
in the level of technical public higher education in the
Commonwealth.

He asserted that additional education was necessary

beyond a high school diploma, yet he saw a newly established
community college system that did not provide for similar
technical programs in its vocational component.

Massasoit's

curriculum was typical and reflected this non-technical emphasis
in Ccureer programs.

In pursuit of this postsecondary technical

training objective. Bill Dwyer was able to exert some influence in
the passage of favorable legislative action regarding funding for
the district.
In the early 1970's, the Blue Hills Regional School District
received state aid under Chapter 74 of the M^sachiisetts General
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Laws.

This funding mechanism provided aid to regional school

districts including their postsecondary activity but, notably,
this formula funding approach did not distinguish between
secondary and postsecondary vocational students.

A categorical

fifty percent reimbursement for expenditures to regional school
districts was the norm.

Thus, all of the technical education

based regional school districts received fifty percent of their
funding from the Commonwealth and fifty percent from local
sources.

At that time, there was no tuition charge made or

permitted under the law.
In 1974 a change was made in the Chapter 74 fimding formula
to provide a sixty fi\^ percent reimbursement for postsecondary
vocational education students vrtiile continuing a fifty percent
reimbursement level for those in secondary programs.

In the mid-

1970's Bill Dwyer also lobbied to obtain legislative permission
for postsecondary institutions offering technical education to
charge tuition to students v^ch would not be factored in the
funding formula.

His objective was to provide financial stability

for regional school districts with postsecondary programs by
continuing a sixty five percent state reimbursement and coupling
it with local tax support and a tuition charge to students.

Bill

Dwyer did not live to see legislation that permitted local
collection of tuition (receipts) but, ironically, it was just that
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legislation he favored so strongly that began the movement toward
the long term financial instability of the Technical Institute.
In 1978 the so-called Collins/Boverini Act changed again the
formula funding process.

It took funding for vocational education

school districts out of Chapter 74 and made local school aid for
all secondary schools subject to a Chapter 70 formula.

Ihis

formula had as its base a "student” and established a base of two
for each technical student and a base of one for all non-technical
students.

For each dollar per student esipended in a given fiscal

year, the state would reimburse the school district in the
following year one dollar for each non-technical student and two
dollars for eadi technical student.

This funding base maintained

the fifty percent advantage for vocational school districts in
recognition of the greater cost of educating students in secondary
technical programs; however, the additional fifteen percent for
postsecondary vocational student subsidy was lost in the
transition, thus placing postsecondary technical students once
again on the same basis as secondary technical students.
The Collins/Boverini Act acknowledged further that receipts
were appropriate for collection at the local level, but such
receipts were to be taken off the gross budget prior to the
computation for reimbursement.
the base for determining aid.

The net budget was then used as
In this way, the Commonwealth

avoided reimbursing school district for that paurt of their budget
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derived from local fees, but at the same time it meant that as
local receipts increased as a part of the total budget, the
relative level of state aid would decrease.
The change in the funding formula enacted in 1978 was
followed soon after by Proposition 2 1/2.

The Regional School

Committee's response to Proposition 2 1/2 was to cease using tax
money frcan the towns to support the Technical Institute.

Prior to

Proposition 2 1/2, a single budget for the High School and
Technical Institute was used to assess the seven towns in the
district.

Therefore, town meeting assemblies in the seven

communities were not made aware of the budget amounts which went
to support either the High School or Institute.

This changed with

the school coiranittee's action in response to Proposition 2 1/2,
when separate budgets were presented for the High School and the
Technical Institute.
Through this action, the school committee made funding for
the Technical Institute very tenuous.

By assigning all local aid

to the High School and diverting it from the Technical Institute,
the committee created a situation in which an increase in tuition
at the Technical Institute would result in a decrease in state
aid.

As the Technical Institute raised tuition levels in order to

meet its operating e25)enses through the early 1980's, state
support for the entire school district would proportionately be
diminished.

The school district would submit its total budget to
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the state for reiiribursement yet reduce that gross budget by the
tuition collected hy the Institute.

Th\is state aid for the school

district would be thereby reduced, idiich was passed on to the
Technical Institute's operating budget.

This downward spiral of

more tuition revenue - less state aid - additional tuition
revenue - less state aid - over time produced an untenable
situation for the institute unless legislative relief could be
found.
In the face of this downward spiral of financial support from
the state, the regional school district did not have the
legislative acumen of Bill Dwyer.

School District Superintendent

Charles Brennan and David Malone, Dean of the Technical Institute,
testified before the Legislatiire's Joint Committee on Education in
1984 in support of a bill filed by a local legislator for separate
categorical aid for the Blue Hills Technical Institute.
Malone recalls that they were not well received.

David

They were

questioned: "If you are a public institution and postsecondary,
vdiy are you not in the community college system?

If you are post¬

secondary and public, then vdiy are you taking Chapter 70 money
earmarked for secondary education?"

Representative Collins, House

Chair of the Joint Committee on Education, advised them that the
problem is for the Board of Education and a Board of Regents to
decide vdiere support for the technical institute belongs.
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A meeting was arranged with Board of Regents and Education
representatives at the Board of Education offices and it became
clear to David Malone that the Board of Education did not want the
Institute included in Chapter 70 and that the Board of Regents
considered the institute a vocational school and, therefore,
subject to Chapter 70 fiinding and not a part of the community
college system.

As a result of this meeting, there was an attenpt

to insert a separate lump sum line item for the Technical
Institute in the higher education budget, but the attempt failed.
The only regional school district in the Ccararvonwealth with an
Associate Degree granting authority found itself without a home in
either secondary or postsecondary education, and apparently
without a political constituency as well [David Malone, personal
communication, August 4, 1989].
It was the failure of this budget request in June, 1984 that
precipitated vigorous efforts on the part of Charlie Brennan to
accomplish the merger.

In contrast to Bill Dwyer's successful

legislative negotiating ability, Charlie Brennan was the ultimate
administrator who worked closely with faculty and students in the
day to day administration of the Technical Institute.

He felt

that the ultimate issue at hand was the continuation of the
Technical Institute to provide students with a conpetent education
and, secondarily, faculty and stedEf with continued enployment
[Charlie Brennan, personal communication, August 22, 1989].
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This is not to say that all of the administrators in the
school district supported merger with Massasoit Community College.
Wilfred Savoie, then a program director but at the time of the
merger the newly designated Superintendent Director, felt that the
Technical Institute could be financially successful by changing
its aM>roach to its educational programs.

He wanted to emphasize

evening and adult programs and to customize training programs for
curea industries.

He thought this arrangement would make the

Institute financially viable over time [Wilfred Savoie, personal
communication, August 4, 1989].

Unfortunately, his

recommendations offered only a potential resolution of a real and
immediate financial problem and would leave intact a rapidly
escalating cost for Technical Institute students v^en comparable
publicly supported community colleges charged only several hundred
dollars in tuition.
The school committee was not unanimous in its support for the
merger.

There was a desire expressed by several long standing

members of the school committee to maintain control of the
institute at the local level.

In addition, these school committee

members all had to face a local electorate and did not want to be
perceived as giving away local assets to the Commonwealth.
Several public trial balloons were floated among the electorate,
most notably an editorial in a Canton newspaper vrtiich argued
against the merger.

It is significant that this editorial was
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written in the Canton newspaper, the site of the school's physical
plant.

It was also the home of a vocal school committee nmiber

v^o opposed the merger, Benson Diamond.

In the following week's

edition of the newspaper, there was a single letter from David
Malone in support of the merger.

There were no other responses.

The editor of the newspaper subsequently advised David Malone that
not even one telephone call was received in response to either the
editorial or David's letter to the editor.
This incident reflected a lack of constituent interest in a
matter previously thought to be of substantive importance to the
residents of the seven towns.

At the time of the actual merger

vote by the School Committee, Benson Diamond made the following
observations to a reporter from the Brockton Enterprise:
Benson Diamond also noted his informal poll Tuesday
of local officials and residents found no opposition
to the n«rger. The group of Harrison Road residents
v^o have asked a lawyer to look into the legality of
the merger never contacted him with their objections,
he said.
"There was not only no groundswell, there was
nothing," Diamond said. "To those people most
affected
the merger, there is no feeling about
it, one way or the other." [June 5, 1985, p. 27]
As a result of this non-issue, the school committee was
politically free to negotiate as good a deal with the Coiraionwealth
as possible.
The Blue Hills Regional School District was the only regional
school district in the state to offer an Associate's Degree for
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its technical programs.

It is not unreasonable to ask if it is

sensible for an aggregation of seven small towns, combined
regionally for the primary purpose of technical secondary
education, to offer the Associate in Applied Science degree.

It

appears in retrospect that the formidable leadership of Bill Dwyer
led previous school committees to make the commitment to
postsecondary education and to bolster that commitit^t by his
substantive legislative lobbying ability.

With his demise and

with the changes in financial aid for the school district, the
school committee emphasized its primary mission of supporting
secondary education.
The change in formula funding seriously hindered the
operation of the institute, especially following enactment of
Proposition 2 1/2.

The School Committee created a financial Catch

22 for the Institute when local aid was withdrawn and the mandate
to become self supporting was initiated.

It was the action of the

school cxmomittee itself in response to a state level action that
accelerated the financial crisis which ultimately resulted in the
merger of the Technical Institute with Massasoit Coraniunity
College.
William Buckley, School Committee member from Holbrook and
supporter of the merger, recalls that the school district simply
no longer afford to operate the Technical Institute.

As a former

principal at Holbrook High School, he felt that local tax based
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support for education should stop at the 12th grade level and that
the towns could not support a 13th and 14th grade.

Although there

was a strong sentiment on the part of the Committee menibers to
keep the Technical Institute, there were no financial alternatives
available.

When it became clear that a merger was likely if area

residents were to continue to have postsecondary technical
programs available to them, the focus of attention became the
amount of money the district would receive for the Technical
Institute assets [William Buckley, personal communication,
August 31, 1989].
With the general consensus of the Blue Hills Regional School
Committee and the Massasoit Board of Trustees that the process of
merger should proceed with appropriate financial support from the
Qammonwealth of Massachusetts, the next step in the approval
process was the Board of Regents of Higher Education.

The

Chancellor of the Board of Regents at the time was John Duff, who
has suggested that the Massasoit-Blue Hills merger could be best
described as painless.

From the Regents' perspective, there was a

united local interest behind the concept of merger and in terms of
public policy it made little educational sense to have separate
associate degree institutions in the same general area.
Additionally, Dr. Duff favored this merger because it represented
an anomolous situation idiich would not create a sudden demand for
additional satellite campuses for other colleges and universities
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in the Commonwealth [John B. Duff, personal communication,
June 5, 1989].

In a system of public higher education with twenty

seven institutions, the Qiancellor must consider the precedent
setting nature of sucii decisions, because other colleges and
universities may wish to e3q>and in the same manner.

Since a

merger was distinct from the creation of a satellite campus, no
precedent was set v^ch could be easily duplicated by the public
colleges and universities.
The Board of Regents supported the merger and there was no
opposition to the action approving the combination.

The local

consensus regarding the advantages of the merger provided the base
upon ^^ch this public issue could proceed.

The area

Representatives and Senators were all either in favor of the
merger or did not oppose it in principle.

With this combination

of administrative and faculty support, local school committee and
Board of Trustee support, and a singular lack of local controversy
concerning the matter, the merger required only a legislative
champion and a willingness by the state Secretary of
Administration and Finance to resolve the financial issues yet
outstanding.
Senator Anna P. Buckley, a Democrat representing Brockton and
several contiguoLS towns, had long been a strong supporter of
Massasoit Community College.

As a itesmber of the Senate leadership

in various positions she was in an especially influential position
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to move consideration of this merger.

While she was convinced

that the merger would be good for the college and the area's
economy, she also looked for a public policy aspect of the
proposed merger.

She was familiar with the financial problems

facing regional school districts throu^out the Commonwealth,
primarily as a result of Proposition 2 1/2.

She felt that one of

the arguments v^ch could bolster support for legislation would be
the potential of using this merger as a model for other actions
concerning the assumption of regional school programs by community
colleges in other areas of the Commonwealth.
Senator Buckley had a programmatic perspective as well.

She

felt the technical couses and programs from Blue Hills would be a
distinct addition to Massasoit's offerings, particularly for
constituents.

At the time the General Dynamics shipyard in Quincy

was moving toward closure
would be out of work.

meant a large number of people

An es^panded Massasoit would provide

retraining for these and other people displaced by plant closings
or other workforce reductions.

These training programs in

technical areas could be especially appealing to holders of union
cards, family people in need of retraining to obtain gocxi jobs.
The merger would provide an opportunity for people to advance
themselves that would not otherwise be available to them [Anna P.
Buckley, personal cornmunication, August 21, 1989].
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There were, of

course, other legislators in support of the merger in 1984 and
1985 or,

if not in total agreement, who went along with the

proposal.
The Massachusetts legislature is often characterized as one
v^ere a strong leadership group exerts substantial influence over
the progress and prospects of legislation.

It was, therefore,

crucial that the college have the support of Senator Buckley.

She

was not only a member of the leadership in the Senate, but had
established a strong working relationship with key members of the
House leadership as well.

With leadership support, legislative

approval of the merger was quite likely.
As a member of the legislative leadership. Senator Buckley
and the local Brockton delegation also had a measure of influence
over administrative executives as well, including the Secretary of
Administration and Finance who had to resolve the financial
aspects of the merger.

The local delegation, \diich included

Representatives Creedon, Kennedy and Mara, met with Administration
and Finance Secretary Frank Keefe to convince him of the merits of
the merger.

The financial issues only remained to be resolved.

How much would the Commonwealth pay for Technical Institute assets
valued at five to eight million dollars, and vrtiich the
Commonwealth subsidized at acquisition and in annual bond
payments?
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Althoijgh there were some allegations by the School Committee
that state officials were trying to steal the Technical Institute
for a minimal price, once serious discussion began the matter was
resolved rather quickly.

Chancellor John Duff presented the

financial offer along with his public statement of support for the
merger at the May 7, 1985 meeting of the School Committee.
Chancellor Duff acknowledged that the Technical Institute belonged
under the domain of the Board of Regents as a part of Massasoit
Ccanraunity College.
The financial proposal placed before the committee on May 7th
was not an outright cash bi:^out but was tied to existing
mechanisms of state aid to local school districts.
instance,

In the first

the Commonwealth agreed to assume responsibility for all

the district's remaining bonded indebtedness of $528,000 which was
payable over a ten year period.

The state also agreed to continue

Chapter 70 funding in the annual amount of $700,000 per year even
though it would not qualify for $340,000 of the money because of
the loss of Technical Institute students.

There was no ending

date provided for this Chapter 70 funding so, conceivably, the
school district could expect to receive this aid ad infinitum.
There was also no guarantee this aid would, in fact, be
forthcoming every year since annual appropriations by the
Legislature were required [John Duff, May 7, 1985].
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There was no way the State coiild commit future appropriations

hy

the Legislature, a Constitutional prohibition.

This lack of a

guarantee of payment under Chapter 70 proved nettlesome:
The board (School Committee) expressed skepticism the
legislatiire would continue the flanding indefinitely.
"None of us in this rocan can predict vhat will happen up
on the (Beacon) Hill," said Chairman Gerard Baker of
Westwood.
"It will continue as long as the state continues to fund
students at the technical schools, vocational schools,"
Duff replied.
The issue of continued Chapter 70 aid could mean the
difference between a merger agreement that would provide
millions of dollars to the district, if the funds are
appropriated indefinitely, or a deal that would yield
little financial retiom, if the state cuts off the money
in a few years. [Brockton Enterprise, May 8, 1985, p. 31]
All of the parties understood the concern expressed by the
School committee regarding the uncertainty of funding, but there
was also a common understanding that nothing could be done about
the matter except to proceed on good faith.

With the acceptance

of the financial offer, only one issue remained.
Concern was expressed by the school coiranittee about the
future use of the facility if it ceased to serve an educational
purpose and wanted any final agreement to include a claiose
reverting the facility to the district in such a case.

Instead of

a reverter clause, the district was given what amounted to a first
option to repurchase the facility if the property ceased serving
an educational function.
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On Jime 3, 1985, the Massasoit Board of Trustees approved the
merger agreement and the Blue Hills Regional School Cammittee
likewise approved the agreement on June 4, 1985.

The Board of

Regents agreed to the merger on June 11, 1985, and legislative and
gubernatorial affirmation followed quickly with the fiscal 1986
budget act.
Massasoit's President, Gerard Burke, was convinced that the
programs offered by the Technical Institute were a perfect
addition to Massasoit's academic program.

A merger of technical

programs with Massasoit's liberal arts and other career programs
would lead to a truly comprehensive community college.

However,

Dr. B\irke, prior to his tenure as President of Massasoit Community
College, had been a Professor of History at Boston State College.
His personal eaqjerience in the merger of Boston State into
UMass/Boston provided a clear foundation for one particular aspect
of the merger: personnel.
Institutional Issues
Massasoit Community College faculty and professional staff
are covered by a collective bargaining agreement with the
Massachusetts Community College Council/Massachusetts Teachers
Association (MCCC/MTA), an affiliate of the National Education
Association.

This collective bargaining agreement covers all

fifteen of the Commonwealth's regional community colleges.
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The

faculty and professional staff at the Technical Institute were
members of a different local of the MTA as well.
Very early in the merger negotiations. Dr. Burke decided that
the merger process would proceed only if all enployees of the
technical institute could be guaranteed employment at least for
one year after the merger.

The Boston StateAJMass Boston

experience was not to be repeated as it applied to the treatment
of individuals.
The issue then became salary and workload.

The faculty

workload at the Technical Institute more nearly paralleled a high
school teacher workload than a college teacher workload.

In

converting the workload of Technical Institute members to that
provided in Massasoit's Iftiion Contract, the Technical Institute
faculty stood to achieve a notable workload reduction from
approximately sixteen to eighteen classroom hours a week to twelve
hours a week.

Since this workload reduction would be a

contractual mandate and would actually increase the need for
faculty at the same enrollment level, the college could
realistically expect to follow through on its guarantee of
employment for at least one year.

The same number of students

were expected to attend the institute after the merger and with
the faculty workload reduced, it was more likely that additional
faculty members would be necessary to cover the same number of
classroom houirs for the same number of students.
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Significantly,

this factual situation bolstered Dr. Burke's emotional commitment
that the merger experience not be a repeat of the negative
personal experience he and others encountered in the Boston
StateAJMass Boston merger.

The issues of salary, academic rank, and seniority are
likewise sensitive issues.

These issues had to be addressed with

a clearly devised approach because it affected not only the new
employment status of the Technical Institute employees, but
Massasoit employees would also be affected by the employment
standing awarded to the Technical Institute personnel.

That is, a

sense of fairness to both the new employees and existing employees
of Massasoit Oarninunity College would have to prevail.
In the first instance, M^sasoit administrators decided to
consider the Technical Institute employees as a group rather than
as individuals.

This approach was taken for several reasons.

Massasoit Community College had no contractual or other existing
method of placing individuals on a salary schedule that weighed
experience, degrees, and other considerations.

Therefore, had the

college chosen to enter salary and rank negotiations with
individual faculty and staff members, there could have been a
disparity created by the negotiation process itself among
Technical Institute faculty members. There could also be a
perceived difference among those hired as a result of the merger
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and continuing Masscisoit employees.

In order to avoid this

individual negotiation process, a group consideration of salaries
was chosen.
Massasoit evaluated several alternative salary offers, but
decided to propose an award to all professional enployees at the
Technical Institute a 6 1/2% increase over their then current
salaries.

This increase was the same general increase that would

be awarded to Massasoit faculty in the same year.

By offering the

same percentage increeuse as MCCC/MTA unit member, the College
could maintain its fairness approach.
•Hie 6 1/2% increase was applied to a base salary rate.

The

College chose to continue Technical Institute enployees at their
Institute salary plus the base increase.

By making an offer v^ch

recognized their continued employment. College administrators
realized that some Technical Institute faculty would be paid at a
higher rate than some Massasoit faculty.

There was no objection

to this continuation of salary by Massasoit faculty or unit
professional employees since the College had the contractual right
to place newly hired individuals at any place on the salary
schedule.
Massasoit faculty considered this base salary plus 6 1/2%
abroach fair, especially since this approach was consistent with
the existing contract.
considered "new hires."

Technical Institute faculty were
As new hires the Technical Institute
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faculty had no accrued seniority; thus, vdiile there may have been
some salary disparities between the Technical Institute faculty
and the continuing Massasoit faculty, there was no long term
threat to Massasoit faculty employment.

The Technical Institute

faculty would always be junior to the Massasoit faculty in terms
of seniority.

The approach to the salary issue violated neither

the \mion contract nor employee morale.
The Technical Institute faculty did not hold academic rank
vdiile the Massasoit faculty held the traditional ranks from
instructor to professor.

Therefore, the Technical Institute

faculty had to be given academic rank as well as being placed on
the salary schedule.

Ihe salary schedule was somewhat flexible so

that a given salary woxild fall in two or three faculty ranks.

The

Dean of Academic Affairs at Massasoit awarded faculty rank based
on degrees and e:q>erience after having first determined vrtiere the
salary would fall in the MCCC/MTA salary schedule.

Placement in

acadsodc rank created no jMroblems since the salary issue was
perceived as paramount.
Paul O'Hara, President of the Technical Institute's MTA
local, suggests that unit members had two primary goals: To
maintain the postsecondary programs at the Institute and to
continue the employment of faculty after the merger.

There was a

fear that the Regional School committee would make a financial
decision and not an educational decision by trying to sell the
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Institute's idiysical plant and land to the highest bidder.

This

perspective had an historical context because of the discussions
over the previous several years concerning the cost to the seven
towns to operate the Institute.

There was little talk of the

benefit of postsecondary education abounding at the time [Paul
O'Hara, personal communication, September 17, 1989].
The merger with Massasoit was the only realistic alternative
that would meet the unit's goals, and Paul O'Hara suggests this
was the source of the near unanimity in support of the merger by
the union local.

The salary, benefits, tenure and seniority

issues were resolved with relative ease, primarily becaxjse of the
open process of discussion that existed between Massasoit and Blue
Hills administration and faculty union representatives.

While

some anomalous problems arose, they were resolved through open
communication and not permitted to become points of contention.
Ironically, Massasoit President Burke's determined effort not
to repeat the Boston State debacle was consistent with the
approach taken by the union.

Both factions wanted the n^rger to

happen and found the recent Boston State e^qjerience sufficiently
threatening to keep discussion about the issues open and above
board.

The Institute professionals also found that Dr. Burke's

positive attitude and personal pledge to avoid the kind of Boston
State situation he had experienced to be helpful in assuaging
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their fears about the unknown [Paul O'Hara, personal
communication, September 17, 1989].
Classified employees (clerical and maintenance) were
similarly accreted to Massasoit's locals of the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Enployees (AFSCME).
Jobs and salaries of Technical Institute classified were matched
as closely as possible to those covered by the AFSCME contract.
Although the process was somewhat more difficult because starting
salaries were contractually prescribed, there were no major
problems in converting Technical Institute enployees to Massasoit
employment categories.
Other personnel issues were resolved relatively easily for
professional and classified enployees.

The Institute enployees as

public enployees were participants in the same retirement system
as state enployees so there was no loss of retirement benefits.
The state employee health insurance program was comparable to that
offered by the Technical Institute and, in fact, provided the
Technical Institute employees with a greater range of choices
among health maintenance organizations (HMOs).

All other

conditions of employment including vacation and sick leave and the
like were covered by the MCCC/MTA contract and were not
negotiable.
There was a single issue that created personnel problems at
the time of the merger: accumulated sick leave.
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By considering

all Technical Institute enployees as new hires, the College gained
significant flexibility in addressing the salary issue.

However,

as new hires, the Technical Institute enployees could not carry
their accumulated sick leave frcan the Technical Institute to the
College.

The MCCC/MTA contract was silent on the matter and the

governing authority became the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Commonwealth, often referred to as the red book.

The red

book rules and regulations for personnel in the Commonwealth
provided that employees of municipalities cannot carry earned
vacation or sick leave credits to enployit«nt with the
Commonwealth.

In order to maintain the consistency of the new

hire approach, the College would not permit Technical Institute
enployees to bring accumulated sick leave to their Coiranonwealth
employment.
In addition, the College did not choose to negotiate with the
existing MCCC/MTA over the accumulated sick leave issue as a
matter of impact bargaining.

The College administration feared to

begin such a process would open the door to other negotiations
with the Blue Hills faculty when all other sensitive issues had
been resolved.

The Technical Institute faculty, having secured an

appropriate salary and reduced workload and equivalent benefits to
their Technical Institute employment, chose not to pursue this
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sole issue.

Subsequent to the merger in 1989, the Union filed

special legislation to carry forward accumulated sick leave for
these employees.
Summary
The merger of the Blue Hills Technical Institute and
Massasoit Cammunity college was amicably accomplished on August 1,
1985.

1110 impetus for merger was local, and institutional issues

related to the process had to be resolved before the proposition
could be brought before the Executive and Legislative branches of
government vdiich held final say in the matter.

The power of a

negative vote could have been exercised by any of the actors
involved.

In retrospect there seemed to be only two factions:

those who favored the merger and those who were indifferent.

Even

student interest reflected this dichotomy, with those favoring the
merger doing so because of the favorable cost reductions vdiich
would accrue to them.

There was some interest among those

students approaching their second year to receive their degrees at
a Blue Hills exercise, and this request was easily acccarplished.
It was this local unanimity vhich made the approval process a
relatively smooth one.

Yet, too, the public policy aspect of this

merger proved compelling, just as it did with the earlier public
sector mergers that created Southeastern Massachusetts University,
the lAiiversity of Lowell and the University of Massachusetts at
Boston.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CC»JCLUSIC»J
As Massasoit Community College was preparing for its eventual
merger with the Blue Hills Technical Institute, College staff
members contacted several out-of-state institutions that had
recently undergone the merger process.

All were quite willing to

share information but the infontal advice was always similar;
Mergers of public colleges are all different because of politics,
and the experience cannot be generalized.

Yet the above

historical review of four public college mergers in Massachusetts
suggests that this casual comment may be too glib.

While it is

not appropriate to propose a general theory of public sector
mergers on the basis of four examples in a single state, it is
possible to make some tentative observations that may be tested by
future research.
Describing public college mergers as political is
tautological since the accomplishment of the merger requires
political action.

It is more helpful to identify the impetus

behind the move toward merger.

Is merger being proposed as a

matter of public policy with institutional considerations assuming
a secondary importance, or is the merger being initiated by the
institutions with political action being focused on validating and
ratifying the movemoit?

This public policy-institutional

prerogative dichotomy is useful as a first distinction in
understanding public college mergers.
The policy-institutional distinction also represents a change
in focus from the literature currently existing in the field.
Most analyses of merger focus singularly on institutional issues,
and v^ile this concentration is iirportant, it seems to miss the
larger context of public policy and the organization and structure
of hi^er education in the political jtirisdiction.
As a matter of public policy, the issue of merger appears to
arise primarily as a function of the availability of public higher
education to the residents of the state.

One of the most

consistent statements made by elected public officials in the
research for this work was that the mergers provided greater
educaticoxal opportimity to constituencies important to that public
official.
It is in this context that Governor Furcolo saw the
importance of merging two textile schools and creating
Southeastern Massachusetts Ikiiversity.

While it was possible in

that situation to point to the academically redundant institutions
in geographical proximity, such an observation, ^diile factual,
would have missed the primary public policy impetus toward merger.
Governor Furcolo repeatedly commented that the merger was brought
about to create greater educational opportunity to the citizens of
Southeastern Massachusetts vdio had been poorly served by public
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higher education.

Similarly, the combination of the Lowell

Technological Institute and the Lowell State College was seen as
an opportunity to provide a more varied educational menu to the
citizens of Lowell than could be provided

the relatively narrow

engineering and teaching fields available at the separate
institutions.
Ihe merger of Boston State College into the IMiversity of
Massachusetts at Boston also reflected this public policy focus.
There was a clear consensus among the political leadership in the
Caminonwecd.th that this n^rger should be accomplished for reasons
that advanced the standing of public higher education in the city
of Boston.

This merger was complicated because of institutional

resistance to this combination, but this should not obfiscate the
primary fact of deliberate state interest in the merger.

While

the immediate context of the merger of the two institutions was
publicly stated as budgetary, the Coinmcaiwealth' s financial status
was merely the precipitating factor in accomplishing the merger.
The Massasoit Conmunity College-Blue Hills Technical
Institute merger represented an instance of an institutional push
toward merger.

In this situation, the two institutions seeking

merger resolved most inter—institutional issues before pursuing a
public resolution of the matter.

Ultimately, the issues of merger

in this instance had to be resolved in the public forum.

While

the merger effort succeeded there because it could be demonstrated
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that the combination of a community college and a technical
institute provided greater opportunity for the region's constitu¬
ents, the justification put forward by M^sasoit Community College
was institution related, that the College could accomplish its
mission more effectively.

Chancellor Duff concurred with this but

took care to observe that this merger would not represent a
precedent which would then be binding on the Board of Regents in
consideration of future mergers.

Senator Buckley, however,

considered the paramount issue to be the greater availability of
training options to her constituents and not the esq^ansion of a
college for that sake alone.
These four public sector mergers also reflected the trend in
public policy toward higher education and the status of the
state's economy at the time.

The merger that created Southeastern

Massachusetts Iftiiversity occurred at a time of e^fpansion of public
hi^er education in Massachusetts, and funds were identified to
accomplish this end.

The merger process that created the

University of Lowell began during a time of continued e:q>ansion of
public hi^er education and stable state finances, but was
accomplished in a year vdien state finances began a decline.

Thus,

promises were made about adequate funding for the new Ikiiversity
of Lowell vdiich were realistic at the time they were made, but the
decline in state finances in the late 1970's precluded following
through with the promises made earlier in the decade.
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The merger

of Boston State College and Iftiiversity of Massachusetts at Boston
occurred in a period vdien state finances were at a low level, and
this fact provided the opportunity to accomplish a policy that had
already been decided.

The Massasoit Coaranunity College merger

occurred at a time vdien the state economy was e:q:>anding rapidly
and funds were available to meet the commitments made during the
negotiation process.

If the Massasoit merger appeared somehow too

good to be true, one reason may be that state funding was provided
to meet all commitments made during the negotiations for merger.
The public policy-institution distinction is meaningful
because institutions are significant participants in the public
debate over merger, even if it is initiated by public officials.
College officials must not only consider the relatively narrow
institutional advantages and disadvantages in a proposed merger,
but understand the larger context of public higher education in
vdiich the merger is being considered.

Institutional autonomy and

self-interest may well be important as normal operating
assumptions but could represent blinders in the public debate over
a proposed merger.
The public policy aspect of merger also looms in these four
examples in the sense that in only one instance was there an
identifiable institutional crisis.

The textile schools in

southeastern Massachusetts and Lowell, the State Colleges at
Lowell and Boston, the Iftiiversity in Boston and Massasoit
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Community College could have continued as publicly supported
institutions in their own right.

There appeared to be no

institutional characteristics that led these institutions toward
merger.

Only the Blue Hills Technical Institute faced a financial

crisis which propelled it toward merger.
Yet while the descriptive word "crisis" does not apply, the
roles of the institutions involved in the mergers that created
Southeastern Massachusetts University, IMiversity of Lowell, and
UMass/Boston were clearly changing from their original public
policy intent.

The textile schools were created to support an

industry that had essentially vanished from the Massachusetts
economy, and teacher's colleges were changing fr<xn the original
normal school concept into liberal arts colleges.

It is not

surprising that in each of these instances the ccohbinations were
made from rather narrow, specialized colleges into more
diversified institutions.

Even the merger of the Technical

Institute into Massasoit Community College provided for an
expansion of the mission of the coiranunity college, even though it
was precipitated by a financial crisis.
In this discussion of public college mergers, one must take
care to consider the special status of institutions of public
hi^er education in the public sector.

Jferger of public colleges

carries with it connotations different from what exists with
mergers of other public agencies.
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If, for example, one was to

consider the merger of welfare departments or other functional
arms of state government, the primary consideration would likely
be the organizational structure

a means to effectively achieve

cis

an objective and not as an end in itself.

Yet in Massachusetts

and probably throughout the country, public institutions of higher
education have considerable autonomy and are perceived to be
members of the higher education ccanraunity, not state agencies.
Therefore, an instance of merger in the public sector appears to
be one area where collegiate institutions^ autonomy meets issues
of state government.

As this study of four mergers in

Massachusetts makes clear, the state ultimately holds the final
say in matters of merger, although the institutions involved may
influence the outcome of the public debate.
Little can be added as a result of this work to the laundry
list of characteristics noted in the literature as being
meaningful in merger situations.

However, several observations

can be made regarding the Massachusetts e3g)eriences which may be
important to those facing a potential merger.

In the first

instance, there seems to be no movement along a continuum of
cooperation that leads to merger.

Indeed, in the four cases

studied, there was a singular lack of cooperative relationshij^
between the institutions merged.

There is siirply no indication

from this sample that cooperative efforts in the public sector
eventually lead to merger.
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Finance almost always plays a role in public policy
decisions.

In three of the four situations studied in this work,

however, finance was less important than the public policy aspects
of public higher education.

The impact of Proposition 2 1/2 in

the merger that created UMass/Boston appears more as a
precipitating factor than a direct cause of the merger.

It was

only in regard to the Massasoit-Blue Hills merger that the local
financial situation of one institution was such that it sought
merger.

The merger actually represented an incremental expense

for the Commonwealth.

It is not inconceivable to perceive a

situation in ^^ch the dominant public policy issue is the
limitation of public e3q5enditures (or revenue) rather than the
level of public higher education.
issues may prevail.

In such an event, financial

Consolidation mergers to reduce the operating

cost of public higher education could be one outcome of such a
debate.
Surprisingly, academic programs per se did not represent a
major part of the discussion in any of the merger situations.

It

appeared that the disposition of existing academic programs was
less of an issue than the prospect of increased opportunity and
expanded programs through the merged institution.

Perhaps the

most important academic aspect in the merger process was the
change in public institutional purpose over time as a crucial
factor in the consideration of merger.
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other items such as faculty quality, reputaticai and personnel
all were part of the institutional consideraticns that were
required to make the mergers effective, but did not aK^ear to be
inherently iitportant in any of the mergers except the Bostcxi State
CoUege-lMass/Bc^ton coofcinaticxi.

In retrospect, it ai^>ears that

had the Bostcai State College cojimmity recognized the
inevitability of merger with UMass/Boston, accoranodation may have
been reached regarding these issues.

However, the attempt to

negate the possibility of merger led Boston State employees toward
a strategy of attempting to exercise its negative vote in the
public debate, haice the prospect of negotiating a favorable
settlement was lost.
Finally, one characteristic was important in all four mergers
in the Conroonwealth: geograi^cal proximity.

This spears more as

a necessary precCTidition to the discussiOTi of merger rather than a
characteristic of the merger process.

If there was no

geograj^cal proximity, mergers were simply not considered.

Even

in the UMass/Boston merger, there was no discussion of merger with
other institutions outside the city of Boston.
In summary, the first effort at understanding mergers of
public colleges and universities is to understand the distinctioi
between public policy and instituticxial prerogatives.

It is also

significant that these institutions participate in a major way in
the public debate ccxiceming merger.
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When all is said and done.

it appears that the predominant factor in mergers of public
colleges and universities is the accomplishment of public
objectives rather than an acccmimodation of the institutions
involved.
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